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Abstract
Organizations responding to humanitarian crises often have different organizational
cultures and observational lenses, presenting barriers to collaborative efforts at the outset
of a crisis. The chaotic nature of these crises exacerbates this problem, slowing the speed
of response and the degree of efficacy of the response effort. Researchers have examined
these organizational differences but have not defined barriers to mutuality and possible
ways to overcome those barriers presenting a gap in knowledge. The purpose of this
study was to fill this gap by offering areas to focus on to improve cultural awareness
between disparate organizations. The central research question investigated the extent to
which intrinsic value descriptions of organizational cultures provide opportunities to
mitigate barriers between the military and humanitarian aid workers. A qualitative study
using narrative ethnography was applied in answering this question. Two Participants
were recruited from the military and two from civilian aid organizations based upon their
experience and insight and their commensurate ability to relate the need for mutual
understanding between their organizations. Data were collected through descriptive
interviews of the participants’ lived experiences in crisis response. The data were coded
using existing theory on cultural dimensions from Project GLOBE and then analyzed
using relational theory. The results confirmed a need for more effective coordination and
unity of effort, which may be achieved through cultural understanding and which can
result in a more efficient crisis response. These findings may ease the suffering
encountered in humanitarian crises by improving the collaborative education of both
military and civilian responders to these crises.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Background of the Study
Organizational cultures often differ between United States military and
humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental
organizations, necessitating mutual understanding and appreciation for organizational
strengths key elements of cooperation in an effort to achieve common goals.
Administrators need to identify and understand organizational differences early in the
relationship and learn to work in a cooperative manner with other organizations that they
aim to leverage in a common purpose. If properly leveraged by organizational leadership,
this phenomenon of having a common purpose and unity of effort can serve as an
effective tool for motivating members of divergent organizational cultures to achieve
common goals. The main objective of this study was to devise a method for increasing
mutuality prior to the occurrence of crisis situations. The outcomes and conclusions I
present in my final two chapters are intended as contributions to the body of knowledge
available to members of organizations who may be called upon to respond to a
humanitarian crisis – prior to or even as the crisis unfolds. I intend to make the results
widely available with the intention of helping solve the problem of initial
misunderstandings that have been observed by study participants from two separate
groups of humanitarian crisis responders who work with the other as a matter of course
during a real world crisis response: Military personnel and civilian humanitarian aid
workers.
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Scholars in many fields have done research as to how culture influences how a
government treats citizens of a nation and how culture must be understood prior to
entering into a humanitarian situation. Taking one step back, the disparate cultures of
organizations responding to a humanitarian situation also need to be examined and
understood by participants in order to effectively work together. Human rights aspects of
humanitarian response have been examined extensively, but cultural values with regards
to humanitarian affairs (instances where response organizations are primarily focused on
relieving human suffering) in response to crises have not. When examining the response
to humanitarian disasters, it is imperative that international responders have an awareness
of organizational culture so that they can deliver aid in an organized and effective
manner.
Organizational leaders can use cultural models of what is deemed to be important
in a particular culture in order to understand the values of a particular organization.
Leaders can supplement these models by drawing from existing literature on cultural
values. Members of civilian aid organizations hold humanitarianism as a core value that
they put into practice through their charters and day to day work. Members of the military
do not necessarily deem humanitarianism as their core competency, but view providing
humanitarian assistance as the right thing to do to relieve human suffering. Members of
both types of organizations ultimately value human life and will provide assistance to
alleviate or prevent human suffering.
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Statement of the Problem
Organizations that typically respond to humanitarian crises often differ with
respect to organizational cultures which in turn presents barriers to effective inter
organizational efforts at the outset of a crisis. This problem can be exacerbated by the
inherently chaotic nature of crisis response and result in friction between organizations,
thus slowing United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to
governmental and nongovernmental organizations’ arrival at the needed cooperative
relationship and ultimately the delivery of aid. This problematic situation is characterized
by parochially-driven organizational barriers, despite the fact that the organizations share
a common desire to alleviate human suffering.
Inherent organizational cultural differences between military and civilian
organizations have degraded the speed and efficacy of humanitarian response efforts.
These cultural differences make necessary a study such as this which provides knowledge
to these organizations in order to promote mutual understanding and appreciation for
organizational strengths as a means of improving cooperation at the very outset of a
crisis. The ultimate goal for my study was to affect social change through inter
organizational understanding and thus enable disparate organizations to better work
together to alleviate human suffering in crisis situations. Studies have been conducted on
how organizational complexity can increase in a crisis situation (Kapucu, 2009), how
inter-organizational relationships in crisis response can be challenging due to inter
organizational diversity (Brower, Choi, Jeong, & Dilling, 2009), and how inter
organizational disparity is a benefit versus a challenge (Stephenson & Schnitzer, 2009).
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While these studies have focused on identifying diversity and challenges, critical a gap
exists with respect to the causal factors of organizational barriers and ways to reduce
them. Prescience of inter organizational cultural disparities and existing parochialisms
that produce barriers at the commencement of crisis response was the ultimate goal of
this particular study.
Purpose of the Study
My study aimed to improve cultural awareness between culturally disparate
organizations and was designed to help those organizations avoid some of the initial
chaos at the outset of a crisis. Crisis response efforts are inherently chaotic in nature, but
developing an earlier understanding of the unique attributes of a separate organization in
advance has the potential to improve the swiftness and effectiveness of crisis response.
In this study, I sought to determine the value of organizational cultural
understanding between disparate organizations prior to crisis response. Research has been
conducted on relationships and effectiveness within and between cultures in humanitarian
and peace operations, but a specific study of the often subjective observations of one
organization’s perceptions of a disparate organization’s culture has not been conducted.
This study and resulting analysis of focused, narrative-style interviews of a variety of
participants of real world disaster relief operations was aimed at increasing cross-cultural
effectiveness prior to and during a crisis event.
I examined the elements essential to collaborative cooperation between
organizations with differing organizational cultures and mandates, and worked to
determine whether a common purpose outweighs cultural differences. Many studies have
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been conducted regarding organizational culture and leadership (Schein, 2010) and the
interrelationship between the organization’s values (how things should be) and its
practices (how things are) (House, Javidan, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002). These prescribed
cross-cultural organizational values, defined by Project GLOBE (Global Leadership and
Organizational Effectiveness), an organization that conducts research on culture and
leadership effectiveness in 61 nations, will define the theoretical basis for this study.
Additionally, my study builds upon a study conducted at the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College that utilized the Competing Values Framework.
This recent study examined the cultural differences between Department of State
employees and Department of Defense military officers in an effort to explore how these
differences related to conducting organizationally integrated and complementary national
security endeavors (Davis & Paparone, 2012).
Nature of the Study
This study was exploratory in nature and thus derived a richer array of data
through the subjective approach associated with qualitative research. I used open-ended
interview questions and observations of interview participants who have experience
responding to humanitarian crises to generate this data. I took a narrative organizational
ethnography approach, and utilized existing theory on organizational culture from social
psychologists Hofstede and Schein as a theoretical basis for the determination of
organizational values. I utilized the cultural dimensions added to Hofstede’s work by
Project GLOBE, a research program that examines culture and leadership. My study
revealed both disparities and likenesses in organizational culture between the United
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States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and
nongovernmental organizations.
The overarching purpose of the study was to determine what barriers exist
between these two organizations and, ultimately to identify modes for improving
mutuality among disparate crisis responders prior to a humanitarian crisis. The participant
pool was comprised of selected individuals with operational experience working side-byside with culturally disparate organizations during a crisis response. The data collection
methodology consisted of interviews of criterion-based samples and inquiry by
observation of those participants during the interview process. I targeted these data
collection tools towards addressing the main research problem. Accordingly, I wanted to
determine how organizational culture can affect the behavioral norms of individuals in an
organization and how those behaviors can be detrimental to collective action with outside
organizations who have a common purpose.
The most recent work of Hofstede et al. (2010) expanded upon Hofstede’s earlier
(1980) work describing a set of six cultural dimensions: uncertainty avoidance, power
distance, collectivism I (societal collectivism), collectivism II (in-group collectivism),
gender egalitarianism, and assertiveness. These cultural dimensions were utilized and
expanded by Project GLOBE (2002) to include future orientation, performance
orientation, and humane orientation. They derived future orientation and humane
orientation from Kluckholn and Strodtbeck’s (1961) studies, and performance orientation
from the works of McClelland (1985). Project GLOBE utilized these cultural dimensions
to diagnose disparities in organizational culture as extant potential causal factors
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contributing to any barriers derived from an organization’s inter-subjective patterns and
habits of thought. Schein’s (2010) work on the progressing levels of organizational
culture provided my study a basis for establishing the degree to which intercultural
awareness of disparities is needed to establish mutuality between crisis response
organizations. I took as a key assumption that this knowledge could ultimately lead to
unity of effort earlier in the event of a crisis.
Research Questions
I tied each of my research questions to existing theory and related research and
assigned each area to an appropriate category or theme, taking heed of the viewpoints of
the participants to insure the questions’ validity. Using purposeful sampling, I selected
participants who were retired military officers and retired members of international
nongovernmental and governmental aid organizations. My research questions were
related to existing theoretical lenses. I validated and coded my targeted participant
questions by using a selection of the cultural dimensions defined by Project GLOBE’s
nine cultural dimensions “performance orientation, future orientation, assertiveness,
power distance, humane orientation, institutional collectivism, in-group collectivism,
uncertainty avoidance and gender egalitarianism” (Gupta, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002, p.
3). My research questions are as follows:
RQ1: How do the organizations being examined differ with respect to a
description of the values associated with organizational culture, and which values
are most important to the individual groups?
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RQ2: What patterns or themes emerge in terms of barriers to mutuality when
analyzing organizational cultural differences?
RQ3: How do the intrinsic value descriptions of organizational cultures result in
barrier mitigation between United States military and humanitarian aid workers
belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations?
Theoretical Framework
I based this study’s theoretical framework on Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov’s
(2010) theory of Cultural dimension in order to assess the cultural disparities between
organizations. These attributes were expanded into nine dimensions by Project GLOBE
(2002), eight of which I applied to my data analysis. I did not apply the cultural
dimension of gender egalitarianism to this study because deemed to be more of an intraorganizational factor and beyond the scope of this study. The resident attributes of
organizational culture and inherent values systems of United States military and
humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations
are often disparate in nature, and can present barriers to coordination of the initial
response to humanitarian crises. These barriers form out of the organizations’ intrinsic
inter-subjective behavior and patterns of thought, producing a parochialism which needs
to be mitigated. The findings of this ethnography-based organizational cultural diagnosis
provide means for such mitigation.
I used the works of social psychologists Edgar Schein and Geert Hofstede as a
theoretical foundation in diagnosing organizational culture, determining intercultural
differences, and recommending ways to improve understanding between crisis response
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organizations. In the case of this study the United States military and civilian
humanitarian aid organizations are likely to find themselves working together in the
humanitarian space. Hence I used the cultural dimensions and other existing theories of
organizational culture as the theoretical basis for diagnosing each culture and then
assessed the differences in organizational culture that may cause such barriers. The
relational theory-based diagnoses produced from my inquiry is intended to inform
decision makers and practitioners in the humanitarian space. Of note, relational theory is
generally applied to the behavioral sciences, specifically in the case of social work, where
“the clinician’s self is not regarded as an impersonal and solid object that perceives the
patient’s projections and transferences, but rather as an interpersonal process in
interaction, which exists not on its own but always and only in relation to some other”
(Shaeffer, 2014, p. 13). As the researcher, I was the instrument of data collection and
applied this theory in a manner related to organizational ethnography.
Operational Definitions
Cooperation: Refers to “cooperative behaviour between two or more entities
focused upon achieving a particular objective, set of objectives or ensuring a mutually
beneficial relationship” (Humanitarian Futures Programme (HFP), 2011, p.6). I used this
term to assess how participants valued working with other organizations and to what
degree.
Humanitarian Assistance: “Actions to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain
human dignity during and in the aftermath of man‐made crises and natural disasters, as
well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations”
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(HPF, 2011, p. 6). This is the type of operation being discussed by means of experiences
of the participants of this study.
Humanitarian Space: Refers to the operating environment in which humanitarian
aid takes place (HFP, p. 26). For the purpose of this study it refers to the geographical
area where organizations are working together to provide alleviate human suffering.
Inter-subjective Behavior and Patterns of Thought: Refers to the human sense of
community within a group. More specifically, Duranti (2010) describes philosopher
Edmund Husserl’s notion as “the human relation with the natural world, the role of tools
and other artifacts in evoking other minds and other lives, the sense of belonging to a
community or to a particular relationship even when others are not co-present, the
participation in particular types of social encounters, the access to and use of human
languages and other semiotic resources” (p. 14). For the purpose of this study it refers to
the intra-organizational relationships that form between members of a group which at
times are exclusive in nature.
Mutuality: Refers to a situation where a relationship forms in which there is an
exchange “both affecting the other and being affected by the other; one extends oneself
out to the other and is also receptive to the impact of the other” (Jordan, 1986, p. 2). For
the purpose of this study, mutuality (as part of relational theory) was examined with
respect to the relationship and exchange between organizations.
Nongovernmental organization (NGO): For the purpose of this study, an NGO is
defined as “an organization established by individuals or associations of individuals.
NGOs are not endowed with government powers” (Georgetown Law Library, n.d.).
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Professional Military Education (PME): “PME conveys the broad body of
knowledge and develops the habits of mind essential to the military professional’s
expertise in the art and science of war” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2011, p. GL-8). For
the purpose of this study, this is one of the venues that could be used to improve
intercultural awareness between disparate organizations.
Unity of Effort: “Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even
if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is
the product of successful unified action” (U.S Department of Defense, 2013, p.256). This
is a commonly used term that is understood by the military and often understood by
members of organizations who have worked with the military. I found that this term was
used by my study participants to indicate a desire to work collaboratively.
Wargaming: Refers to a process in which military planners analyze potential
courses of action for a military operation. The process takes into account the flow of
actions in the intended operation with respect to forces, the operating environment, and
any opposing forces. It is intended to determine if a course of action is feasible and
acceptable and if, according to joint military doctrine, “each critical event within a
proposed COA should be wargamed based upon time available using the action, reaction,
and counteraction method of friendly and/or opposing force interaction. The basic
wargaming method (modified to fit the specific mission and operational environment)
can apply to noncombat as well as combat operations” (U.S. Department of Defense,
2011, p. IV-27). For the purpose of this study, this is one of the possible venues in which

12
better organizational understanding can be accomplished by means of participation by a
variety of military and non-military organizations.
Assumptions
I made some assumptions with respect to the participants of this study, and I
identified these up front in order to mitigate any challenges to validity and to allow for
flexibility during data collection.
My first assumption was that participants would be willing to participate in my
study due to their lived experiences conducting humanitarian assistance. I assumed that
they would therefor agree with the purpose and importance of my study. This assumption
was based upon pre-existing conversations in professional settings with the participants. I
have formed positive working relationships with a wide range of military officers and
civilian aid workers during my career. This has been accomplished by means of
professional schools, conferences and networking in the realm of humanitarian
organizations writ large.
Lastly, I assumed that the interviews would be of and open nature because of my
established rapport with the participants as is necessary with a narrative ethnographic
study. None of my participants were from a vulnerable population and the subject matter
is, for the most part, non-controversial. All of the participants had worked with culturally
disparate organizations, are not profit driven (all are from either the public sector or
nonprofit organizations), and thus understand the importance of unity of effort when
alleviating human suffering.
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Scope and Limitations
The immersive part of this ethnographic study was limited to personal and
professional relationships formed by working and collaborating with participants by
means of professional conferences, and exchanging contact information and personal
experiences at schools. The key limitation was therefore my inability to observe the two
preformed groups working an actual disaster or crisis, which is both unpredictable and
financially and physically untenable.
Throughout the study, I was careful to avoid personal organizational cultural bias
as a retired military officer, and I kept that bias from influencing the interpretation of
opinions and trends in the study. Bias was not only an ethical consideration in my study,
but also a potential threat to validity as readers may read my biography and make
conclusions regarding bias.
A key limitation of my study was the transient nature of military officers and
humanitarian aid workers. This created challenges in my recruitment of study participants
and in simply finding a mutual window of availability the interviews that I needed to
conduct. Accordingly, I made the assumption that some participants for the intensive
interviews may change. Several of my participants were transient due to their having
expeditionary occupations forcing me to conduct the interviews by phone. The intended
interviewees are often in areas such as Liberia, Uganda, Ethiopia, Jordan and Japan as a
normal part of their jobs.
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Significance of the Study
The purpose of this qualitative study was to help Military and civilian
humanitarian crisis responders overcome the lack of the understanding of inter
organizational cultural disparities and existing parochialisms by providing knowledge of
these disparities to both policy makers and organizations involved with crisis response.
The gap in knowledge that warrants this inquiry was that studies have examined how
organizational cultures exist and how organizations can better coordinate post-crisis, but
they have not ascertained what the barriers to mutuality are. The foundation of my
inquiry was formative evaluation and was inductive in nature. The inductive nature was
appropriate for the intended purpose--that of filling the gap in research which exists
regarding the determinate factors contributing to a lack of efficiencies in coordination at
the outset of a humanitarian crisis. Accordingly, my inquiry sought means of improving
the effectiveness of the coordinated responses of culturally disparate crisis response
organizations (Patton, 2002, p. 221). More specifically, I sought to provide insight to
stakeholders on how to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance efforts by
means of inter cultural awareness. Ultimately, providing informational tools on cultural
disparity to crisis responders has the potential to save more lives and relieve human
suffering sooner rather than later in a crisis by stimulating mutuality among the various
crisis response organizations. These informational tools will provide building blocks for
educators and practitioners through publication of the data in curricula and online
humanitarian relief resources.
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Chapter Summary
The United States government, specifically the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA), responds to an average of 70 disasters outside of its borders every
year (OFDA, n.d., para. 1). The United States military provides support to OFDA for an
average of 12% of those disasters (OFDA, n.d.). Contrary to what is seen in the press, the
United States military is generally not the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for the United
States government response to disasters both at home and abroad.
The capability to respond rapidly to disasters, coupled with the sheer size of the
United States military make it a very capable option for supporting response
organizations. Disaster relief is not the core capability of the United States military, but
when it is selected as a support option, prescience of expected organizational cultural
disparities with other responders and vice versa may lead to earlier mutuality. Ultimately,
this may lead to the organizations involved arriving at unity of effort sooner in the
disaster. An examination of relevant existing literature will provide a foundation to this
study in chapter two. I will analyze the literature, taking into account the theoretical basis
of organizational culture and the known organizational cultural attributes of the
organizations to be examined.
Chapter 1 has shown the underlying need for this study. Further, it has
demonstrated the utility of the information derived from my results and analysis, and has
shown how my study contributes to the body of knowledge regarding the causal factors
of barriers to collaborative cooperation.
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Chapter 2 lays the literary groundwork that is relevent to this study and provides
an analysis of existing literature while assessing applicability. Ultimately, I use my
literature review to describe how I determined the need for a study of this nature.
Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology and demonstrates why an
ethnographic approach is appropriate for this from of data collection and analysis. It
includes a description of the research design, the data collection venues, participant pool
and selection criteria, as well as the method of data analysis. Chapter 4 provides the
analysis and results of the study, and Chapter 5 concludes the study by providing
recommendations for how to use the analyzed data while also indicating the potential for
further research.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
In this chapter, I present the lens I used for arriving at my general areas or topics,
and I offer a topically organized examination of literature. Various studies and scholarly
articles have been written about the organizational cultural differences, both perceived
and actual, between organizations who respond to humanitarian emergencies. I found a
gap in knowledge, however, in the assessment of organizational cultural differences by
means of experiential interviews of participants who had operational, one the ground
experience working with disparate organizations. The synopsis of this current literature
section sets the stage for my examination of the need to study this gap in knowledge. The
subsequent sections include reviews of literature on humanitarian assistance,
organizational culture, and the complexity of organizational cultural differences. I also
offer a focused examination of military culture versus civilian aid worker culture, and the
nexus of coordination between these disparate cultural groups. The chapter concludes
with the idea that there may exist potential barriers to inter organizational coordination.
Humanitarian assistance operations are inherently complex and dynamic, whether
aimed at disaster relief or the myriad of other types of assistance including human rights
work. This complexity and dynamic nature stems not only from the physical
environment, but also the socio-cultural environment. Add responders from outside of the
affected nation, and there exists a solid mix of both national and organizational cultural
differences converging in this environment. There exists a vast amount of literature on
the influence of culture-both organizational and national—and on the complexity of
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humanitarian situations. These studies generally focus on interactions between disparate
cultures either during or after working together, or in some cases simply identify and
investigate the differences that exist. They do not focus on experiential data and derived
relational assessments from practitioners from military and humanitarian organizations
gathered through interviews focusing on those experiences. Accordingly, a more
proactive approach is warranted to avoid the ad hoc nature of stakeholders meeting for
the first in the humanitarian space. There is a gap in knowledge with regards to studies
aimed at finding effective ways mitigate the resultant barriers to coordination amongst
culturally diverse organizations responding to a humanitarian situation. There is indeed a
need for these organizations to have the knowledge and tools to effectively work
together. Organizational cultural awareness by members of organizations from the
international community responding to humanitarian crises is essential to the formation
of a knowledge base how to relieve suffering in an efficient and complementary manner.
This knowledge base could conceivably allow responders to better leverage the
assortment of capabilities present in the humanitarian space. Cultural models are often
used to assess the norms and rules of a culture may facilitate an understanding of that
culture’s values. Theories on culture presented in existing literature can provide a lens for
assessing the cultural landscape of an organization.
Literature Search Strategy
This study has its foundations in my observation of and personal involvement in
disaster relief and other civil-military coordination efforts during my career in the U.S.
Navy. It was readily apparent to me that better understanding between the different
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organizations involved in disaster relief, prior to a disaster, would have led to more
efficient relief of human suffering. I observed this lack of understanding and the
associated psychological challenges incurred by survivors and responders personally as a
responder to Hurricane Andrew in Miami in the early 1990s.
I have since become an educator who focuses on instructing military officers from
the United States and other friendly nations about humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief. Accordingly, my day-to-day job includes continual research on disaster relief,
civil-military relations, and culture (both national and organizational). This background
has provided a solid foundation of articles, books and case studies, as well as a network
of like-minded professionals for my early PhD studies and associated research.
My literature search started by simply seeking out like-minded researchers and
authors and asking them for recommendations of literature that they had found useful.
This is where I obtained the materials I used to establish the theoretical basis of this
study, Schein’s and Hofstede’s work on organizational culture. I also spoke with a former
colleague (Davis) who had recently done a study that explored the organizational cultural
differences between military officers and State Department Foreign Service Officers. My
study builds directly on Davis’ work. I then used databases available to me at both the
Walden University Library and the National Defense Library including One Search,
JSTOR, EBSCO Academic Search Complete, and Google Scholar. My keyword search
included: humanitarian assistance, organizational culture, interagency dynamics, NGOs,
military culture, cultural disparity, civilian-military coordination, wicked problems, and
complexity. Additionally, I discovered some of the literature in the course of finding
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scholarly articles to use in my duties as a curriculum developer and educator at the Joint
Forces Staff College. I also used reference lists in related literature to expand my array of
literature, and personally contacted specific authors to discuss the study and obtain
recommendations. Other online sources I used for the review included the Strategic
Studies Institute website, the U.S Agency for International Development website, the
RAND Corporation website, and the Congressional Research Service website. I also
perused library bookshelves and hardcopy journals. My literature search focused on
scholarly, peer-reviewed articles and books by experts in the areas being studied.
Often people and organizations involved in crises take note of lessons learned and
best practices after the fact. The problem is that these “lessons learned” can become more
“lessons noted” as they are written down and not referred to again unless there are serious
consequences as a result of bad practices. One recurring theme of crisis response is the
lack of efficacy at the outset of a crisis due to a lack of awareness of the capabilities and
organizational cultures that the variety of response organizations brings to the
humanitarian space or operating environment. A recent example that highlights this
problem is from a workshop held in June of 2010 by the U.S. Agency for International
Development and The U.S. Department of Defense. The proceedings highlighted the
need for an international framework for crisis response, a need for previously established
personal relationships between members of response organizations, and the need for
better information sharing amongst responders – to name a few.
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Synopsis of Current Literature
Studies have been conducted on how organizational complexity can increase in a
crisis situation (Kapucu, 2009), how inter organizational relationships in crisis response
can be challenging due to inter organizational diversity (Brower, Choi, Jeong, & Dilling,
2009), and how inter organizational disparity is a benefit, not a challenge (Stephenson &
Schnitzer, 2009). Stephenson and Schnitzer (2009) argued that humanitarian
organizations do not need to lose their individuality or unique cultural landscape to
effectively respond to crises. These studies were focused on identifying diversity and
challenges, but left a gap with respect to the causal factors of organizational barriers and
ways to reduce those barriers. The ultimate goal of my particular study was to facilitate
prescience of inter organizational cultural disparities and existing parochialisms that
produce barriers to effective crisis response.
Humanitarian Assistance
It can be observed from research on humanitarian assistance that many
organizations and analysts meet regularly to discuss the difficulties and successes disaster
response. One common theme in the literature is that there needs to be a universally
understood coordination process in place for international disaster response. This
observation is reasonable and sensible, but without buy-in from the myriad civilian and
military response organizations, a coordination tool and associated processes can never
come to fruition. A key challenge that Olson (2008) of the Strategic Studies Institute
(SSI) pointed out is that organizations responding to a crisis want to coordinate, but no
one wants to be coordinated (p. 225). He also pointed out that in a complex situation
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where a variety of organizations come together to accomplish a desired end, the very act
of doing what the individual organizations intended to do can result in making the
situation worse without coordination (pp. 216-217). It was my assertion that the root of
the problem may very well be that disparities in organizational culture add to the already
complex systems and environments.
Coles and Zhuang (2011) offered a solution to coordination challenges in the
wake of natural disaster by applying game theory to disaster relief. Game theory
essentially examines relationships between groups of actors in a given series of situations
(games) and studies the outcomes of these various “games” (p. 4). The results are used to
predict future outcomes based upon interaction of actors in order to support decision
making (p. 6). The authors set the stage by asserting that the wide-range of organizational
cultures of responders, termed “actors” in the study, coupled with outside responders’
unfamiliarity with the environment (cultural or otherwise), turns the disaster response
operation into a complex situation. They focused on the recovery phase since there is
little time to organize efforts earlier in the disaster. I would argue that this is too late in
the operation to improve effectiveness of disaster responders, which is largely the intent
of my study. Essentially, they showed that earlier actions can impact outcomes for both
sets of actors, allowing for earlier decisions to set the stage for better recovery efforts and
ownership by the host nation. Their study ultimately aimed to form partnerships between
culturally disparate actors, an aim that resonates with the intent of my study.
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Organizational Culture
A vast amount of literature revolving around the concept of organizational culture
has been written in recent times (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov, 2010). Hofstede,
Hofstede and Minkov (2010) described some of the challenges involved in measuring
values in a culture and stated that it is this measure that should be the first element of
comparative research between cultures. The central theoretical concept was that cultures
vary with respect to a set of attributes or what Hofstede, et al. (2010) referred to as
“cultural dimensions”: dimensions “power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance
index, and masculinity and femininity” (pp.40- 41)”. The authors broadly defined culture
as “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group
or category for people from others” (p. 6). This theoretical work allowed me to apply this
concept to both nations and organizations. This was caveated by Hofstede, et al. in their
assertion that national cultures are more enduring than the more superficial organizational
cultures (p. 346). They assessed that individuals will not always act in a manner
consistent with the way that they score on a questionnaire that measures preferences and
caution that when interpreting statements, a researcher must “distinguish between the
desirable and the desired: how people think the world ought to be versus what people
want for themselves” (p. 28). This tied directly to how I worded my interview questions
when using them as data collection tools to develop my pilot study. It also provided a
basis for applicable coding and follow on data analysis utilizing Historical Discourse
Analysis (HAD) and Membership Categorization Analysis (MCA). Hofstede, et al.
described the “desirable” as measuring norms, which are an absolute (what is ethically
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right), and the “desired” as more of a statistical measure of majority wants (p. 29).
Accordingly, the term desirable was most appropriate when constructing an attitude
assessment and relational theory analysis about organizational culture. Hofstede et al.
(2010) conducted a research project (Institute for Research on Intercultural Cooperation –
IRIC) that examined culture on both a cross-national and cross-organizational level. For
instrumentation and methodology, the study used a mixed methods model starting with
interviews and following up with pencil and paper questionnaires utilizing a Likert scale
based upon six cultural dimensions (Hofstede et. al., 2010).
The need for an understanding of one’s own organizational culture to increase
organizational effectiveness has been established as a norm of improvement. This area of
study has been supported with assessments of organizational values, both current and
desired, by Cameron and Quinn (2006) amongst others. To expand upon this concept, I
determined that there is a need for better intercultural understanding between disparate
organizations with a common interest of responding to a crisis. My purpose in this
assertion was affect to improvement the effectiveness of response efforts. Cameron and
Quinn (2006) published a supporting methodology that was designed to establish the
current state of an organization’s culture, determine the desired culture, and provide a
pathway to move from present to desired conditions. Their methodology provided an
assessment framework to aid organizations to understand the core dimensions of culture
and recognize the different forms of culture. Cameron and Quinn (2006) espoused an
approach to improvement in organizational effectiveness that starts with a much
neglected assessment of the type of organizational culture that exists (pp. 2-6). The
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authors used the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) which consisted
of a questionnaire containing six questions (each assessing one of the six key dimensions
of organizational culture) as a means to diagnose organizational culture. This instrument
was based upon Cameron, Quinn, DeGraff and Thakor’s (2006) Competing Values
Framework (CVF) from which flows a theory that different aspects of an organization
function “in simultaneous harmony and tension with one another” (Cameron, Quinn,
DeGraff, and Thakor, 2006, p. 6).
In an article by Karkoulian, Messarra, and Sidani (2009) the authors described the
“Correlates of the Bases of Power and the Big Five Personality Traits: An Empirical
Investigation. Allied Academies International Conference Academy of Organizational
Culture, Communications and Conflict” (p.71). The authors argued that, in addition to
what members of an organization regard as enduring beliefs of qualities of effectiveness,
the predominant personality types in an organization define how members are motivated
by the types of power wielded by leaders (Karkoulian, Messarra, and Sidani, 2009).
Accordingly, the authors assessed in this study that “personality traits are viewed as
significant and powerful variables, and are perceived as the most central psychological
tools for directing and controlling behavior” (Karkoulian et al., 2009, p. 72). In their
study, the researchers used an assessment of the “big five” personality traits
(agreeableness, extroversion, emotional stability, conscientiousness, openness to
experience) as a framework for evaluating work behavior across cultures (Karkoulian et
al., 2009).
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Gupta, Hanges, and Dorfman (2002) conducted a study for Project GLOBE
(Global Leadership and Organizational Effectiveness), utilizing the concept of “Cultural
Clusters” as a methodology and for data collection and the determination of their
findings. Their study intended to place different societies into clusters based upon various
societal forces the main three being geographical proximity, mass migrations and ethnic
social capital, and religious and linguistic commonality (p. 11). The purpose of the study
was to assist with theory development with regards to determining potential boundary
considerations when considering management decisions (by multinational corporations
with regards to investments) and interventions (humanitarian or otherwise). The
researchers used previous research, historical analysis and other factors such as language
and religion to divide societies into clusters. They then did an analysis of the clusters
using variables to predict membership in order to test their original classifications. The
researchers concluded by presenting a description and membership of ten clusters, to
include characteristics of the societies within these clusters (pp. 12-15). The description
of the societies in these clusters was useful to my study in that it helped to focus on what
cultural factors must be considered by responders to disasters.
House, Javidan, Hanges, and Dorfman (2002) published another article for Project
GLOBE regarding culture as it relates to leadership theories in which they also provided
background information on Project GLOBE. The article examined the some of the
modern results of a globalized society and the resulting connections among different
cultures. The central purpose of this article was to determine the cultural influences in
societies that impact leadership and the need for leadership and organizational theories
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that cut across cultures to determine what works and what does not (p. 3). The
researchers developed a series of objectives in order to develop a theory regarding the
impact of cultural variables on leadership and organizational processes in a society. The
conclusion was the construction of a theory that the “attributes and entities that
distinguish a given culture from other cultures are predictive of the practices of
organizations and leader attributes and behaviors that are most frequently enacted,
acceptable, and affective in that culture” (p. 8). This article was valuable to my study in
that it provided a theoretical model to examine when trying to influence leadership in a
nation to provide better development and thus be less vulnerable to natural disasters.
Legro published a 1996 article that discussed the influence that culture has on
international cooperation. He likened international cooperation to a complicated dance
due to culture and preferences by the involved organizations (p. 118). He further offered
a helpful domestic model of cultural explanation of preferences that contrasts with the
view that the desires of the state are driven by functions and constrained by the
international system controlling them (p. 118). Legro suggested that there is a disparity
between having a cultural view of an organization as opposed to having a structural view.
Specifically, “a cultural view anticipates that organizations with similar formal structure
may have very different understandings, interests, and behavior… a cultural view
anticipates that the prevailing beliefs in a military can lead to a bias for either escalation
or restraint” (p. 121). Alternately “a functional view of organizations (one compatible
with the realist position outlined below) recognizes that organizations come into being for
specific purposes...this view expects that organizations will pursue those purposes in a
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functional manner in light of environmental circumstances” (p. 121). This article
demonstrates where priorities lie within a state organization as influenced by culture, thus
demonstrating their willingness to coordinate with others in the international community.
In his book Organizational Culture and Leadership Edgar Schein (2010)
identified three levels of culture that are essential to analysis of an organizational culture:
observable culture, shared values, and common assumptions. He describes how there is
increasing difficulty of analysis as researchers work from one level to the next, with
observable culture containing the most obvious indicators and common assumptions of a
culture requiring deeper immersion (Schein, 2010). This layered approach to cultural
analysis provided me with a means to recommend an approach to taking intercultural
understanding from one level to the next deeper level. Culturally disparate organizations
may never arrive at the common assumptions level of intercultural understanding, but the
efforts to move from one level to the next may prove fruitful to better intercultural
coordination.
Observable aspects of organizational culture manifest themselves in the actions
and decisions of an organization’s members. Hilhorst and Schmiemann (2002) conducted
a study on the relationship between an organization’s principles and its culture utilizing
an ethnographic approach. They interviewed a selection of members of Médecins Sans
Frontières (MSF) – Holland, which is a humanitarian organization modeled after the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (Hilhorst & Schmiemann, 2002, p.
490). Humanitarian organizations base their operations on the founding principles of
humanitarianism, which are based upon International Humanitarian Law (IHL), the start
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of which being the Geneva Convention of 1864 (Hilhorst & Schmiemann, 2002, p. 491).
These principles are “humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service,
unity, and universality” (ICRC, 2013, para. 3). These principles lead to an organization’s
culture and “in classic organizational thinking, precede policy, which in turn precedes
implementation” (Hilhorst & Schmiemann, 2002, p. 493). Essentially, these principles
manifest themselves as an organizations code of conduct which is set by the founders and
translated into writing (policy) by managers, and thus carried out by the staff as guiding
principles for their actions (Hilhorst & Schmiemann, 2002, p. 493). It can be argued that
this general organizational process can be applied to most organizations and provides a
commonality when examining the organizations that were analyzed in this study. This
generalized commonality is merely a foundation, however it is the differences between
military and aid organizations that creates an additional layer of complexity during a
mutual response to a crisis.
The Complexity and Complements of Differences
Kapucu (2009) used complexity theory as a basis for a study of the inter
organizational dynamics involved in crisis response and concluded that theses dynamics
have increased in complexity over time due to the need for adaptation within the
environment. Brower, et al. (2009) presented a conceptual model of the how challenges
to inter organizational learning and effectiveness are exacerbated by emergency
management scenarios. Others have viewed organizational disparities as an asset to
multi-faceted operations, indicating that complex scenarios require a complex solution.
Acosta, Chandra, Sleeper and Springgate (2011) conducted a study that probed effective
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gains realized by coordination of domestic governmental efforts by leveraging the
capabilities of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
Military Culture
Military culture, the United States military in particular, has been the subject of a
rich amount studies with varying viewpoints and varying areas of emphasis. Some of the
most relevant articles to this study revolve around the collective nature of military culture
and its evolution to a professionalized service in the case of the United States military.
The contemporary involvement of the United States military in noncombat operations
such as stability operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as day to
day “helping hands” type of activities (such as the deployment of hospital ships to
provide routine medical care to nations without capacity to provide for their own citizens)
provides evidence that there are cultural aspects and values that are not kinetic in nature.
This is diametrically opposed to what some civilian organizations view as a militarization
of the humanitarian space as is discussed by Baumann in his 2014 article that discussed
civilian and military organizations working together. He described how clashes in
organizational culture between these types of organizations can create challenges to their
integration of efforts in stabilization efforts in a destabilized operating environment. Of
note I, the researcher for this particular this study, am a retired career military officer
with experience working with civilian organizations.
Kirke (2008) published an article in which he described viewpoints on the
definition of military culture. He argued that the typical mindset of historians and
political scientists is to characterize military culture as nothing more than an extension of
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aristocratic culture. This is due in part to their focus on the officer corps which, in the
past, was drawn from the aristocracy (an example is the case of England), and were the
vessels of maintaining military values (2008). He further posited that military culture is
not the same as militarism, a culture of violence as is seen by some, but must be
examined as a subset of society (2008).
Thus military culture must be studied with respect to its relationship to the greater
society that surrounds it, the State, other organizations with which it interacts (which he
argues should be classified as institutions) in order to get a clear, unadulterated picture of
its true nature (Kirke, 2008). He substantiates this by observing that military culture as
well as other societal institutions are interrelated (2008). Essentially, military culture is a
microcosm of the greater society and cannot be dissociated from other inclusive
organizations in that society for a researcher to objectively study this institution. It can be
argued here, as supported by Wilson (2008), that today’s military in the United States is
more professionalized in nature, drawing its members (both officer and enlisted) from the
whole spectrum of society.
Further, as related to my study, military forces find themselves participating in
noncombat operations such as disaster relief which is not a situation, in some cases,
where militarism is appropriate. The efficacy in these noncombat operations is perhaps
due to, for one thing, the military value of cohesion as is discussed by Kirke (2010).
Kirke, of the Defense Academy of the United Kingdom (UK) asserted that cohesion is a
vital element of military unit effectiveness (2010). His article viewed cohesion in military
organizations as something that occurs separately from what is the main purpose of the
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organization, but is supportive of that mission due to its inherent organizational value of
collectivism (2010). This is directly tied to Hofstede, et al.’s (2010) cultural dimension of
collectivism versus individualism–the good of the whole outweighs the good of the
individual. This element of cohesion, coupled with long periods of separation from the
home and family causes the military to take on what Hilhorst and Schmiemann describe
as a “closed community” nature (Hilhorst & Schmiemann, 2002, p. 493). Other members
of the organization form the only social network in a “closed community” as the
members do not go home or work on a frequent basis with outsiders, resulting in what the
military calls “unit integrity”. This is directly tied my study and my desire to determine
what adds to the efficacy of civil-military responses to humanitarian disasters and what
could potentially, from the viewpoint of organizational cultural disparities, lead to
barriers to a comprehensive approach to response efforts.
Briceno (2009) took a broader viewpoint in his development of a cultural model
used for the assessment of values based differences. His descriptive articles was part of a
compilation of articles regarding cultural considerations in military operating
environments-referred to as “Operational Culture” (p. 37). He applied the aforementioned
cultural dimensions of Hofstede (2010) in his conceptualization of a cultural model for
use by the United States military. In this model, different cultural values are examined
with respect to their significance among the indigenous population (pp. 37-40). These
values would be ranked with regards to their importance on a numerical scale (the highest
number being the most significant) and, additionally, a justification of ranking must
accompany the ranked value (pp. 37-38). This model was fundamental to my study in that
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it provided ideas of a methodology for coding using elements of culture as ranked by
their relative importance to an organization or population.
Davis and Paparone (2012) conducted a study that assessed how members of the
US Department of Defense and members of the US Department of Stated ranked
themselves and ranked each other with respect to organizational values. In their study
they applied the theory of organizational effectiveness modeled upon what members of
an organization culturally hold as beliefs about what makes an organization effective
(essentially what they value). This study used the CVF (Quinn & McGrath, 1985) and the
OCAI (both described earlier) as an instrument of measurement in quantitative study on
the organizational cultural differences between United States military Officers and
Department of State Foreign Service Officers. Their findings of military culture
demonstrated a view that adhocracy, being innovative and not staying with the norm was
bad and that their organizational culture is characterized by a strong sense of mission
accomplishment (market value) and, to a lesser degree a hierarchical value (pp. 34-36).
They stated in their results “the DoD respondents perceive their organization expects
them to be hard drivers, producers, and competitors. They are more used to tough and
demanding leaders than are the State respondents. DoD respondents also identify that
their home organization expects well-planned actions that achieve measurable goals and
targets” (p. 35). The results of this study, coupled with additional research and studies on
the organizational cultures of the military, civilian aid organizations and the nexus
between the two provided data to validate the findings of my study.
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Some other elements that provided data validation were found in research
conducted by Nancy Roberts, professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate
School. Her 2010 article examined the organizational cultural disparities between NGOs
and the military that exist in the Post-Cold War Era. Her article examined the
organizational cultures of the military and international NGOs in order determine “how
best to structure for effectiveness the increasingly vital peacekeeping and humanitarian
efforts of the military and NGOs in failing or failed states and combat zones around the
world” (p. 212). Her assessment of military culture is described as having:
•

Organizational structures that reinforce hierarchical authority.

•

Clearly defined of command and control relationships.

•

Rules of engagement that are clearly defined to ensure accountability to policy
makers.

•

Roles, responsibilities, and unity of command definitions that are necessary to
achieve the mission successfully

•

Pride in the ability to conduct advanced planning and organized execution
tasks in support of the mission (p. 213).

These elements of military organizational culture, coupled with the elements in
the aforementioned studies were used to validate participant statements in response to
interview questions in order to answer my research questions. As such, I used them to
augment the organizational cultural themes derived from interviews with questions and
analysis founded on existing theory on cultural dimensions.
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Civilian Aid Worker Culture
In a 2011 RAND Gulf Studies report by Acosta, Chandra, Sleeper, and Springgate
authored a 2011 RAND Gulf Studies conference report on the nongovernmental sector’s
involvement in disaster resilience. They examined the merits of federal, state and local
efforts in coordinating with and leveraging the capabilities of nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs). The report made recommendations to conference agenda
discussion areas that focus on policies and programs in support of the active involvement
of NGOs in domestic disaster recovery (pp. 11-13). The study, though domestic in nature
discussed ways to improve areas such as information exchange, resource allocation and
clearly breaking out responsibilities between stakeholder, and thus provided ideas to my
research for breaking down organizational barriers.
Rubenstein published a (2003) article that examined the considerations of crosscultural organizational efforts in complex peace operations. The article discussed how
“cultural models provide a coherent, systematic arrangement for the knowledge that
characterizes each cultural group” (p. 31) and further discussed how people from
different cultures (those responding to complex peace operations to include the military,
nongovernmental organizations and international civil servants) become culturally
competent with regards to each other’s cultures (and the culture that they are operating
in) through observation and experience via activity. The methodology of the study
presented by Rubenstein is tied closely to this idea of “cultural competence” and therefor
provided a good foundation my intended study. It must be noted here that in reality,
however, these organizations form collaborative cells after a crisis begins, (Center for
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Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine (CDHAM), 2009) thus taking a step
backwards when they find themselves in the midst of a crisis.
In an alternate view Stephenson and Schnitzer (2009) professed that humanitarian
organizations don’t need to resort to this mono-centricity. The authors posited that
humanitarian organizations can be equally effective by employing Polanyi’s concept of
poly-centricity in these types of situations, where the various organizations maintain their
own autonomous rules and norms while at the same time mutually accommodating each
other for maximum effectiveness in relief operations (p. 929).
I previously described a study of humanitarian aid workers conducted by Hilhorst
and Schmiemann (2002) which aligned internationally recognized humanitarian
principles with this type of organization’s culture. These humanitarian principles define
the code of conduct for members of the organization and frame the culture of the
organization. The following list and definitions demonstrates the underlying principles
adopted by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement – an international
consortium of humanitarian societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (SommersFlanagan, 2007).
The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement:
•

Humanity: The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born
of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the
battlefield, endeavors, in its international and national capacity, to prevent
and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to
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protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes
mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all
peoples.
•

Impartiality: It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious
beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of
individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the
most urgent cases of distress.

•

Neutrality: In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement
may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a
political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

•

Independence: The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while
auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to
the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy
so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles
of the Movement.

•

Voluntary service: It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any
manner by desire for gain.

•

Unity: There can be only one Red Cross or Red Crescent Society in any one
country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work
throughout its territory.
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•

Universality: The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in
which all Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and
duties in helping each other, is worldwide (p. 191).

Hilhorst and Schmiemann (2002) applied some of these principles to their study
of members of MSF who had recently returned from humanitarian assistance fieldwork.
It must be noted here that MSF in only one of thousands of humanitarian aid
organizations in the world, so this study is only a representative sample of how the
humanitarian principles apply to organizational culture. The results of the ethnographic
interviews demonstrated that this particular NGO demonstrated the attributes of a “closed
organization” (p. 496). The interviewees indicated a positive view of the “unbureaucratic” nature of the organization during their work conducting humanitarian
assistance, specifically being empowered with responsibility and flexibility of decision
making and actions (p. 497). They indicated that they like the “horizontal” nature of the
organization; un-bureaucratic and independent (p. 497). Hilhorst and Schmiemann’s
(2002) findings ultimately stated that:
When asked how principles ordered their action, it was remarkable that volunteers
more often referred to what may be termed organisational ordering principles than
to the humanitarian values normally associated with the notion of principles. On
the basis of the interviews, four such ordering principles were identified: an unbureaucratic attitude, a focus on emergency relief, democracy, and ownership.
Democracy applies to the notion that each person has a voice in the organisation,
and ownership implies that 'we are all a big family' (p. 497).
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The most resonant values emerging from the interviews were found to be the unbureaucratic attitude and the focus on emergency relief (p. 497).
These organizational values, or cultural themes are similar to Roberts (2010)
study of civilian-military working relationships in the Post-Cold War era. Her findings
indicated the following cultural attributes exist in civilian humanitarian organizations:
•

Relief of human suffering is paramount and is blind to the victim’s
nationality, political or ideological beliefs, race, religion, sex, or ethnicity.

•

Organizational mandates are to be fulfilled by staying autonomous,
neutral, and impartial.

•

Taking instructions and being tasked by outside organizations is generally
not done.

•

They value their freedom of operations and are thus are suspicious of
attempts to organize or integrate with others.

•

Their organizational structures tend to be decentralized with respect to
authority and decision making. This decentralization enables them to
quickly adapt as needed while conducting field level operations in austere
operating conditions.

•

They tend to assemble in an ad-hoc manner when needed and execute on
the fly.

•

The value transparency, member accountability, and consensus-based
decision making as opposed to directives or orders from their headquarters
(p. 213).
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These elements of civilian aid worker organizational culture, coupled with the
elements in the aforementioned studies were used to validate participant statements in
response to interview questions in order to answer my research questions. As such, I used
them to augment the organizational cultural themes derived from interviews with
questions and analysis founded on existing theory on cultural dimensions.
The Nexus: Civil-Military Coordination
The theory of organizational effectiveness being modeled upon what members of
an organization culturally hold as beliefs about what makes an organization effective was
applied in a study by Davis and Paparone (2012) that used the CVF (Quinn & McGrath,
1985) and the OCAI as an instrument of measurement. Davis and Paparone conducted a
quantitative study on the organizational cultural differences between United States
military Officers and Department of State Foreign Service Officers. Their study was
described in their 2012 article and stated that they “determined that not only would an
intra-cultural assessment be insightful (how one views one’s own organization), but also
that an inter-cultural assessment (how one views the other’s culture) would also be
fruitful” (p. 31). They concluded that “there seemed to be considerable overlap in shared
values with this population, which reflects more integration than differentiation” (p. 38)
and suggested further research in similar areas such as how NGOs “see themselves with
respect to governmental agencies” (p. 38) as I proposed in my intended study.
Conclusion: Disparities among Organizational Cultures-Potential Barriers
When examining the existing literature on the response to humanitarian disasters,
organizational cultural awareness on the part of international responders is essential to an
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initial understanding of how to best deliver aid in an organized and effective manner. The
organizations described in this literature review are among the types that that typically
respond to humanitarian crises. I assessed from the exiting literature on these cultural
groups that they (the military and humanitarian aid workers) often differ with respect to
organizational culture, thus presenting a barrier to effective inter organizational efforts at
the outset of a crisis. Using cultural models from previous studies of what is deemed to
be important in a particular culture led me to a determination of what aspects of culture
are important in a particular organization. Additionally, methods of examining cultural
values were drawn from existing literature, providing a theoretical basis for assessment of
organizational cultural disparities.
A vast amount of time, study and legislation has been devoted to finding ways to
improved civil-military coordination, particularly within the Executive Branch of the
U.S. Federal government. In a crisis event where human lives are at stake, such as in the
case of a natural disaster, a variety of civilian and military organizations converge in the
humanitarian space with the ultimate goal of providing aid. Too many times, however,
these organizations or systems are dealing with one another’s disparities and knowledge
thereof for the first time and taking a giant step back or what I like to call “meeting on the
dance floor for the first time”. This takes a complex environment and makes it what is
termed by Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber (Ritchey, 2008) to be a “wicked problem” or
one that is both structurally complex and unpredictable.
The United Nations (UN) has responded to this convergence of aid organizations
by taking their array of agencies and organizing them into sectors. This was after
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observations of humanitarian disasters associated with Darfur and the Indian Ocean
Tsunami of 2004 and was termed the “Cluster System” (Jensen, 2012). The Cluster
System essentially provides responders outside of the UN to know who to go to for a
specific type of aid, for example, a nongovernmental aid organization such as Project
Hope would go to the World Health Organization sector on the ground for medical
supplies. Taking this a step further, Yeomans and Stull (2013) described how the US
government military and civilian response organizations could plug into this system with
and International Operations Response Framework (IORF) mirrored on the domestic
National Response Framework (NRF) (Yeomans & Stull, 2013). Translating a domestic
framework overseas and adding in the array of responders requires not just a framework
or mechanism; it requires advance knowledge of the potential barriers to coordination. In
my study I intended to find one of the root causes of barriers – basic organizational
cultural differences between civilian and military organizations – and provide that
information in a venue such as the UN’s Reliefweb.Int.
To examine the aforementioned root causes, I deemed an ethnographic approach
to be the most appropriate. This methodology, in its purest form, uses the application of
cultural anthropological concepts to establish, explore and analyze cultural
characteristics. This allows for the identification of both real and perceived differences
and contributing stereotypes and barriers.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
In this chapter I present the qualitative methodology that utilizes narrative
interviews in an effort to provide a richer exploration of this mainly ethnographic
approach. I describe my observation and interview methods and the theoretical methods
of inquiry, including considerations of other methodologies and a description of the
ethnographic approach. I then restate the research questions, describe the methods of data
collection and analysis by examining the purpose of the research and the specifics of the
questions that were asked during interviews, and finish with a discussion of ethical
considerations.
This study follows the pragmatist epistemological tradition of ethnography by
informing stakeholders about the body of organizational research on societal practices
which uses analysis and presentation of holistic, grounded accounts of “how the social
world works” (Watson, 2011, p. 210). My research was intended to explore and reveal
differences in organizational culture between the United States military and humanitarian
organizations in an effort to pinpoint barriers to unity of effort during disaster relief
operations. Ethnographies, by their very nature, involve the various elements of field
research and have the potential to provide a rich addition to organizational and
managerial studies (Watson, 2012). Accordingly, I chose an ethnographic approach
(specifically organizational ethnography) because of the nature of the study’s main
attribute of exploring the shared characteristics and complexities of culture-sharing, pre
organized groups. I used an array of cultural dimensions as a theoretical basis for
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structuring my participant observations and in-depth narrative interviews of key
participants in past humanitarian assistance efforts (one military and one civilian). These
cultural dimensions are based upon those of Hofstede, et al.’s six cultural dimensions,
expanded by project GLOBE by adding “performance orientation, future orientation,
assertiveness, power distance, humane orientation, institutional collectivism, in-group
collectivism, uncertainty avoidance and gender egalitarianism” (Gupta, Hanges, &
Dorfman, 2002, p. 3).
This study required me to form relationships with participants in order to better
assess day-to-day activities of each group and the meanings associated with those
activities related to humanitarian assistance. I also used opportunistic sampling and a
narrative approach for interviews of participants from each organizational type that has
experience working with the other type of organization. Taking cue from Watson (2012),
I approached ethnography as a “culturally holistic social science genre” as opposed to
just a methodology (Watson, 2012, p. 16). This allowed me to enrich social science
research by enhancing the classical immersion and observation style of ethnography with
the full range of social science investigative techniques as I deemed appropriate.
Ethnographies allow for adaptations in the midst of the study as Neyland (2008)
describes. More specifically Soin and Scheytt (2006) advocate the use of narrative
methodologies as a complementary method of studying organizations as I intended in this
data collection and analysis.
As is recommended by Creswell (2013), ethnographer David Fetterman provides
a sound basis for the phases that a researcher should step through for an ethnography. In
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this study, my analysis and interpretation utilized a realist ethnographic approach as its
basis, maintaining my position of a researcher who has a particular stance about the
culture-sharing group being studied and taking an objective, third-party role (Creswell,
2013). One of the main challenges to ethnographic studies that Creswell (2013) identifies
is that the researcher needs to have some sort of a background or knowledge of cultural
understanding. In the case of this study, I have a Bachelor of Arts in Cultural
Anthropology, and thus I possess an academic foundation for my knowledge of cultural
understanding.
Cultural understanding of an organization’s values and accepted behaviors can be
derived by means of organizational ethnography as a basis for study. Organizational
ethnography is characterized by field work that places the researcher in a role of
observing day-to-day work places (or other organizational venues) as a natural versus a
priori setting (Yanow, 2012). This allows for an objective collection of the etic of the
organizational participants that when combined with the interpretation, or emic of the
researcher, ultimately provides a comprehensive “cultural portrait” of each organization
(Creswell, 2013, p. 96). I accomplished this in my study by engaging with participants
during civilian-military coordination conferences, humanitarian disaster response
simulations, and general conversational engagements.
My methodology involved determining the characteristics of culture-sharing
groups by means of organizational ethnography. I characterized these culture-sharing
groups by developing “cultural portraits” of each group based upon the literature
described in chapter two and by means of participant interviews and observation. After
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deriving the two disparate organizations’ “cultural portraits,” I assessed cultural
differences and potential barriers to mutuality based upon the aforementioned research
questions. In order to derive meaning associated with this “cultural portrait,” I worked to
“gaining access to the conceptual world in which [my] subjects live so that [I could], in
some extended sense of the term, converse with them" (Geertz, as cited in Yanow, 2012,
p. 32). Yanow further describes ethnographic research as being a sort of methodology in
which the researcher has the freedom to adapt the methodolgy due to the ambient
situation and cultural context.I adapted this ethnographic methodolody into a narrative
ethnography by asking open ended questions that drove the participants to relate lived
experiences that related to organizational culture. These questions allowed me to derived
the aforementioned “cultural portrait” of the participant’s parent organization as well as
their perception of the disparate organization’s “cultural portrait”. The ambient situation
was of a informal, conversational environment that allowed me to both derive cultural
themes by means of participant responses and to observe participant reactions to
questions.
Methods of Data Collection
In this study, I interviewed people from two very different organizations (military
officers and civilian aid organizations) in a neutral location. From the interviews, I
expected to encounter similarities within the groups due to elements of inter-subjective
behavior and found this to be a true assumption. These elements of intersubjective
behavior were the values and accepted behaviors of the two culturally disparate
organizations. Also, as expected, I encountered differences between the organizational
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cultures, some of which were nonparticipant deemed by participants to be barriers to
mutuality. I have regularly been a nonparticipant observer of members from both groups
working together, and this helped me formulate my assumptions about each group and
ultimately help me to identify the need for this study. With regards to ethical
considerations, I gained authorization from the Institutional Research Board at Walden
University to conduct participant interviews and observation during the interviews. I also
informed my participants that their participation was voluntary and anonymous, and I
obtained written permission from each as part of the study. In writing, I fully explained
the purpose and design of the study to the participants. Prior to the interviews I provided
participants a written protocol form, and then reinforced the purpose, design, and ethical
requirements verbally at the outset of observations and interviews.
I conducted interviews with a relational theory lens that focused not only on how
organizational members view themselves, but also on how they the other organization,
and I worked to establish trends based on the cultural dimensions. I a priori coded the
interview transcripts. The a priori coding was based upon the relationship between
organizational bias with regards to inter subjectivity within each organization and bias
with regards to perceptions of the other organization by utilizing a cultural model. By
conducting interviews with members of each organization at a neutral location (or by
phone if travel costs were prohibitive) and using open-ended questions, I was able to
assess trends (themes) of how the participants perceived one-another (thus deriving
stereotypes) and how the members perceived their own organizational values and
practices. I also observed the participants during the interviews in order to derive what
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the participant was more descriptive of in their experience conducting humanitarian crisis
response operations. I observed the participants for nonverbal cues to determine what
elements of organizational culture were most poignant to them both within their
organization and with respect to the disparate organization. One particular nonverbal cue
was the amount of time spent discussing a cultural theme. For example, it is my view that
if a participant provides a detailed description of an actual event relating to an interview
question, then this particular theme is of higher importance to their personal, lived
experience. I recorded my observations using Janesick’s (2011) journaling procedures to
determine how participant perceptions reflected these themes and related to how
relationships change and evolve into mutuality.
Theoretical Methods of Inquiry
This study was exploratory in nature and thus derived a richer array of data
through the subjective approach associated with qualitative research that uses open-ended
interview questions and observation of participants during interviews. It was readily
apparent to me what topics and areas of discussion the participants felt passionate about. I
noted these, as they tended to spend more time detailing personal experiences when they
wanted to illustrate their feelings and values regarding a particular area of discussion. I
considered use of quantitative inquiry by means of a quasi-experimental design, but the
inductive nature of the study’s purpose warranted either the use of qualitative inquiry or
mixed-methods. I deemed narrative ethnography to be the most appropriate design, as
this study used existing theory on organizational culture from Hofstede and Schein as a
basis, adding the additional cultural dimensions identified by Project GLOBE.

49
An ethnographic approach to qualitative research aims to examine and document
shared patterns of behavior within a particular group (Creswell, 2013). Ethnographic
researchers immerses themselves in the particular day to day lives of the group being
studied to examine values, beliefs, behaviors, and languages of the group being studied to
determine the meaning of these elements (Creswell, 2013). I accomplished this by
forming relationships with local volunteer organizations, and visiting and meeting with
them on a nonparticipant observer basis. This approach is a qualitative method of inquiry
that is an accepted and widely used manner of studying societal issues and societal
change (Patton, 2006). Additionally, there exists a rich body of both inter and intra
organizational studies using ethnography as a basis, thus making the method highly
researchable and less vulnerable to challenges to validity. This wide acceptance and use
in the social sciences not only aligns with nature of this study, but also add to validity as
it is particularly appropriate to any study of culture (Patton, 2006). Ethnography can also
be narrowed to accommodate organizational ethnography as suggested by Patton (2006)
and will be employed in this study.
Pre-formed groups provided a participant pool and the method of data collection
consisted of interviews of purposeful samples and inquiry by observation. This supported
the main research problem that aims to examine how organizational culture can affect the
accepted norms of behavior by individuals within that organizational culture to the point
that it conflicts with outside organizations with a common purpose. The ethnographic
approach allowed for the examination of experiences of a particular group and the
cultural influences that have contributed to those experiences. Ethnographical studies in
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existing literature were examined for similar phenomena utilizing the theoretical lenses of
Schein and Hofstede. The works of these social psychologists have been widely used in
studies of both national and organizational culture. Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov’s
(2010) work (based upon earlier works of Hofstede in this area and augmented by
additional cultural dimensions used by Project GLOBE) with respect to cultural
dimensions were used to diagnose cultural differences that were assessed to be causal
factors contributing to inter-subjective behavior and patterns of thought. Schein’s (2010)
material on the different levels of culture were used to examine the amount of inter
cultural knowledge that is needed to arrive at mutuality.
Edgar Schein is the author of Organizational Culture and Leadership (2010), in
which he describes his theory that there are three levels of culture. The lowest level (level
one) is what he terms “artifacts” or more simply the aspects of a culture-sharing group
that we see, but that we do not necessarily understand (p. 24). The next higher level of
culture (level two) is termed “espoused beliefs”. The espoused beliefs and values of an
organization originate in personal values and beliefs of what an individual feels about
how things should be versus how things are (p. 25). The personal values and beliefs of
those individuals who prevail in decision making when individuals come together as a
group may become the shared values of the group (p. 25). Level three, the deepest level
of cultural understanding, is termed by Schein (2010) as “basic underlying assumptions”
(p. 28). This is when an organization uses the same effective solution to a problem to a
degree of repetition that the behavior becomes second nature and the degree of variation
or alternative solutions are not considered (p. 28). These three levels of culture formed
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the basis for my recommendations in chapter five for a way ahead for disparate
organizations to improve awareness of the values and behaviors of organizations that they
could potentially encounter in the humanitarian space.
My study examined the differences in organizational culture between United
States military officers and civilian aid workers to determine what barriers result from an
organization’s inter-subjective patterns and habits of thought, and how to improve
mutuality prior to a humanitarian crisis. My recommendations to improve mutuality prior
to a humanitarian crisis are founded upon attainment of a higher level of intercultural
understanding using Schein’s (2010) levels of culture as a basis. The purpose of my study
and theoretical basis of cultural considerations warrants the use of a qualitative,
ethnographic means of inquiry.
Research Questions
My central research question was whether a common purpose outweighs cultural
differences between culturally disparate organizations (in the case the military and
nongovernmental organizations) in situations where they need to work together, such as
in humanitarian assistance crisis response operations. My sub-questions were related to
existing theoretical lenses (Schein (2010) for organizational culture and McClelland for
human motivation) and targeted participant questions were validated by a selection of the
cultural dimensions (providing a basis for coding) defined by Project GLOBE. The most
recent work of Hofstede, et al. (2010) expanded upon Hofstede’s earlier (1980) work
describing a set of six cultural dimensions: uncertainty avoidance, power distance,
collectivism I (societal collectivism), collectivism II (in-group collectivism), gender
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egalitarianism, and assertiveness. These cultural dimensions were utilized and expanded
upon by Project GLOBE (2002) to include future orientation, performance orientation,
and humane orientation. They derived future orientation and humane orientation from
Kluckholn and Strodtbeck’s (1961) studies and performance orientation from the works
of McClelland (1985). Project GLOBE utilized these cultural dimensions to diagnose
disparities in organizational culture as extant potential causal factors contributing to any
barriers based upon inter-subjective behavior and patterns of thought. It was assumed that
this knowledge will ultimately lead to unity of effort earlier in the case of a crisis event.
RQ1: How do the organizations being examined differ with respect to a
description of the values associated with organizational culture and which values
are most important to the individual groups?
RQ2: What patterns or themes emerge in terms of barriers to mutuality when
analyzing organizational cultural differences?
RQ3: How do the intrinsic value descriptions of organizational culture result in
barrier mitigation between United States military and humanitarian aid workers
belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations?
Methods and Data Collection Analysis
Purpose of the Research
The day-to-day organizational cultures and intrinsic value systems of United
States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and
nongovernmental organizations often differ and can present barriers to their mutual
response to humanitarian crises. These barriers result from an organization’s inter-
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subjective patterns and habits of thought and potentially a parochial view of working with
disparate organizations. This can have deleterious effects on efforts to alleviate human
suffering and saving lives in the humanitarian space.
On the other end of the spectrum from an organization’s inter-subjective patterns
and habits of thought is the phenomenon of mutuality during which disparate
organizations overcome barriers while operating in the humanitarian space. It can be
argued, however that this is too late in the process to efficiently aid those in need whose
government lacks the capacity or will to assist them. It is the aim of this study to explore
ways to arrive at an at least a moderate state of mutuality prior to entering the
humanitarian space by arriving at a state of mutual understanding and appreciation for
inter organizational strengths. These are some key elements of the cooperative efforts to
cooperation achieve common goals.
Existing theories from experts in the field of organizational culture, such as Edgar
Schein and Geert Hofstede were used as a theoretical basis for diagnosing intercultural
differences between the United States military and civilian aid workers, two
organizations proposed to have disparate organizational cultures and are likely to find
themselves working together in the humanitarian space. Hofstede, Hofstede and
Minkov’s (2010) characterization of organizational cultures utilizing what they term
“cultural dimensions”: “power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance index, and
masculinity and femininity” (pp.40-41) were used as the theoretical basis for assessing
the differences in organizational culture. These cultural dimensions were based upon
Hofstede’s earlier work from 1980 and are expanded upon by Project GLOBE (2002) as
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described earlier in this chapter. It was imperative that this assessment be performed on
the subjects of the study as a first step of cross-cultural examination as is supported by
Hofstede et al. (2010) and Project GLOBE (2002). The interview questions that I
provided to the sample participants (military officers and civilian aid workers) were
worded to derive which cultural dimensions dominate each organizational culture and
define what sets the two apart and what similarities exist between the two. My questions
were also targeted at deriving perceptions of one organization by the other, thus evoking
discussions of barriers to mutuality.
The second step of the cross-cross cultural examination of disparate organizations
or culture-sharing groups is observation. This observation took place my means of my
observation of participant reactions to questions and the ensuing discussion during
interviews. Interviews were narrative in nature, so it was essential to derive participant
reactions and emotional responses during their description of lived experiences in the
field during humanitarian response efforts. I was able to assess what elements of their
experiences were most poignant by observation. This was done by evaluating how
passionate they were about the need to come to a consensus of each organizations efforts
and how much time and detailed description they used to tell their story. The observation
field notes will be recorded on my IPhone and then transcribed with an observation sheet
using Janesick’s (2011) observation methodologies. The various outcomes are intended
to aid decision makers in the humanitarian space and ultimately policy makers.
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Sampling Strategy and Size
The two groups that I recruited participant samples from were U.S military
officers and civilian aid organization aid workers. This was done in a purposeful
sampling manner. The underlying phenomena of intersubjective behavior within these
different organizations and the effect of mutuality (and which phenomena would
dominate in a crisis) led me to think that examining the underlying causality of these
phenomena was more appropriate to the purpose of my study. Therefore, I concluded that
with respect to the narrative interview portion of the study, the intensity sampling method
was most valuable to the purpose of this study as it provided an information-rich
examination of samples to reveal the basis and causes of the phenomena that it was
desired to illuminate (Patton, 2002).
Based upon the purpose of my study an in-depth, targeted data collection was
warranted. In order to accomplish this and provide the appropriate and helpful
information to the intended audience, the sample size was relatively small, but the
questions utilized effectively probed participants to provide detail in depth. Of note, I had
already established relationships with individuals and have worked with the other type of
organization in question (I am retired military, but have worked with civilian aid
organizations). The narrative interviews were conducted on an individual basis from a
small group of individuals who have actively participated in operations where military
officers and civilian aid workers worked side-by-side providing humanitarian assistance.
My original intent was to draw the military participants from students in my
workplace. Creswell (2013) warns the researcher of risks associated with presenting a
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study of one’s own “backyard” as is in the case of this first sample of participants (p.
151). Risks include items such as putting ones job in jeopardy by presenting negative
aspects of the organization (p. 151). Accordingly, this plan was found to be fraught with
difficulties, so I drew my participants from an array of military officers outside of my
workplace that were retired and had experience responding to humanitarian crises. They
also had a minimum of thirty years in their organization and held prominent positions
during the humanitarian crises, allowing for a narrative, ethnographic approach. Their
first-hand experience in prominent positions allowed for a deeper narrative account of
their personal experience and their years of experience in their respective organization
allowed me to apply elements of ethnography to my analysis. The sample size was two
senior military officers.
For the sample size of civilian aid workers, access and resources (travel funding)
available was limited. There are several NGOs, such as Operation Blessing and
Operations Smile, as well as the American Red Cross, in my geographical area who have
vast experience in the realm of humanitarian assistance. During the time of the study,
these organizations were deployed in support of various international humanitarian crises,
such as the Ebola outbreak in Western Africa and the natural disaster in Nepal. My
solution to the difficulty of having available participants was to recruit retired civilian aid
workers that I had networked with in the past at professional forums and schools. Like
their military counterparts they also had a minimum of thirty years in their organization
and held prominent positions during the humanitarian crises, allowing for a narrative,
ethnographic approach. Their first-hand experience in prominent positions allowed for a
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deeper narrative account of their personal experience and their years of experience in
their respective organization allowed me to apply elements of ethnography to my
analysis. The sample size was two civilian aid workers, one of which from a private, nongovernmental volunteer organization and the other from a governmental organization that
routinely responds to humanitarian crises.
Methods of Analysis
I designed each interview question to answer one or more of my research
questions. They were written in an open-ended manner allowing for deep discussion and
data collection based upon the participants’ lived experiences in order to draw out
statements (raw data) that could be aligned to the cultural dimensions of Project GLOBE
(2002). The interview questions that were provided to the sample participants (military
officers and civilian aid workers) were worded to dissect which cultural dimensions
dominate each organizational culture and define what sets the two apart and what
similarities exist between the two.
The second step of the cross-cross cultural examination of disparate organizations
or culture-sharing groups is observation. This observation took place my means of my
observation of participant reactions to questions and the ensuing discussion during
interviews. Interviews were narrative in nature, so it was essential to derive participant
reactions and emotional responses during their description of lived experiences in the
field during humanitarian response efforts. I was able to assess what elements of their
experiences were most poignant by observation. This was done by evaluating how
passionate they were about the need to come to a consensus of each organizations efforts
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and how much time and detailed description they used to tell their story. The observation
field notes were recorded on my IPhone and then transcribed with an observation sheet
using Janesick’s (2011) observation methodologies. The emerging themes from the
cultural dimension based data collection were then hand-coded in an a priori fashion,
drawing out key observations and statements aligning with the cultural dimensions.
As Gibbs and Taylor (2010) discuss, themes identified from a priori ideas such as
pre-existing theories to start coding and then allow the bias that the participants provide
to form a basis for my study. In this study I used an appropriate selection of a priori ideas
from Project GLOBE’s nine cultural dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, power distance,
societal collectivism, in-group collectivism, gender egalitarianism, assertiveness, future
orientation, performance orientation, and humane orientation) (House, et al., 2002) to add
theoretical and historical validity to the previously mentioned study questions and to
allow for the development of themes. The interviews, just as the observation field notes,
were recorded on my IPhone and then transcribed. The interview questions were:
Question 1: What do you think makes your organization successful? What are you
proud of with respect to your organization? (In-group collectivism, future
orientation, performance orientation, humane orientation)
Question 2: What makes the leadership in your organization effective in
producing organizational and public value? Do you personally feel empowered by
your leadership? (Uncertainty avoidance, power distance, in-group collectivism,
assertiveness, performance orientation, humane orientation)
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Question 3: How are decisions made in your organization? (Power distance, ingroup collectivism, humane orientation)
Question 4: How often have you worked with members of organization y? What
is your opinion of organization y? (If the person has not worked with the other
organization, the questioning strategy with drive the interviewee to provide their
opinion of the organization (Future orientation)
Question 5: What value do you see in working with organization y? (Societal
collectivism, future orientation, performance orientation, humane orientation).
Question 6: Do you think that barriers exist between your organization x and
organization y that affect working relationships? (Uncertainty avoidance, power
distance, in-group collectivism, assertiveness, performance orientation, humane
orientation).
Data Organization and Management
I hand transcribed each recorded interview and then sent each transcript to the
respective participant for verification and agreement. I then a priori coded each interview
question response and discussion, noting any observations. I counted the number of
positive and negative views of each cultural dimension and tallied up each interview
question for frequency coding, but also looked beyond frequency for what was deemed to
be the most important element being discussed by the participant. An illustration of
positive and negative is if a participant views itself as having a positive degree of a
particular cultural dimension, the code would be a +1 for the participant organization. If
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the participant viewed the disparate organization as having a negative degree of a cultural
dimension, the code would be -1.
The a priori coded interview transcripts and observation provided me with raw
data for analysis of emerging cultural themes based upon the cultural dimensions of
Project GLOBE (2002). Each interview question, inclusive of relevant statements and
researcher observations of participants were transcribed onto a Microsoft Excel
spreadsheet (table 1). I constructed a spreadsheet for each interview question with the
cultural dimensions on the y-axis and the participant code, supporting literature and notes
on the x-axis. I then transferred the coded participant statements that were particularly
relevant to the cultural dimension onto the spreadsheet. This allowed me to derive themes
regarding cultural differences and similarities, as well as potential barriers to mutuality. I
must note here that these data organization spreadsheets were solely used for my handson organization purposes and were originally hand written on large “butcher-block”
paper. They are thus not included in the appendices of this dissertation.
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Table 1
Data Organization Spreadsheet
Interview Question
_______________________________________________________________
Cultural
Participant Participant Participant Participant Supporting Observations/
Dimension
CAG
CAP
MO1
MO2
Literature/
Notes
Data
CD1
Code
Code
Code
Code
Uncertainty Frequency: Frequency: Frequency: Frequency:
Avoidance
Statement: Statement: Statement: Statement:
CD2
Code
Code
Code
Code
Power
Frequency: Frequency: Frequency: Frequency:
Distance
Statement: Statement: Statement: Statement:
CD3
Code
Code
Code
Code
Societal
Frequency: Frequency: Frequency: Frequency:
Collectivism Statement: Statement: Statement: Statement:
CD4
Code
Code
Code
Code
In-Group
Frequency: Frequency: Frequency: Frequency:
Collectivism Statement: Statement: Statement: Statement:
CD5
Code
Code
Code
Code
Gender
Frequency: Frequency: Frequency: Frequency:
Egalitarian- Statement: Statement: Statement: Statement:
Ism – N/A*
CD6
Code
Code
Code
Code
AssertiveFrequency: Frequency: Frequency: Frequency:
Ness
Statement: Statement: Statement: Statement:
CD7
Code
Code
Code
Code
Future
Frequency: Frequency: Frequency: Frequency:
Orientation Statement: Statement: Statement: Statement:
CD8
Code
Code
Code
Code
Performance Frequency: Frequency: Frequency: Frequency:
Orientation Statement: Statement: Statement: Statement:
CD
Code
Code
Code
Code
Humane
Frequency: Frequency: Frequency: Frequency:
Orientation Statement: Statement: Statement: Statement:
*Note. Gender Egalitarianism was not used in this study as I deemed it to be beyond the scope of
the research.

Limitations and Ethical Concerns
Throughout the study, I knew that I needed to avoid personal organizational
cultural bias as a retired military officer to keep that bias from influencing the
interpretation of opinions and trends in the study. This is not only an ethical consideration
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of this research study due to bias, but also a potential threat to validity as readers may
read my biography and make conclusions regarding bias. I sent out numerous invitations
to potential participants, but only received five positive responses, which was within my
number (4-6) approved by the Walden University Institutional Research Board (IRB). My
IRB approval number is 04-01-15-0253434. It must be noted here that one of my
participants suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, so data collection became
problematic and I did not pursue this person’s further participation due to not wanting to
re-traumatize her. I conducted interviews and observations after gaining approval from
the Walden University IRB and after obtaining participant signed agreements. I also read
the agreement forms to each participant at the start of each interview and asked if there
were any questions or concerns.
After obtaining permission to conduct interviews and observations, I ensured that
participants were informed of the voluntary nature of their participation. Additionally, I
kept the identities of the participants anonymous. I needed to characterize each
participant with a code and that allowed me to discern who they are and what
characteristics they possess. This allowed me to provide the results of the study to
participants to aid me as the researcher with checking for the validity of my data prior to
publishing to results. For quality assurance of the research plan, which is based upon
ethnography, the researcher will use Creswell’s (2013, pp. 262-263) suggested questions
to assess the quality of the study quality as the actual study has not yet competed been
completed. Specifically:

63
•

The researcher must clearly identify the culture-sharing groups to be studied (p.
263)

•

The cultural themes to be studied must be specified (p. 263). In this case the
theoretical framework will be used to observe the etic of the culture-sharing
groups.

•

The culture group must be clearly described (p. 263).

•

Cultural themes will be identified and derived after applying the theoretical
framework, thus leading to the ultimate emic (p. 263).

•

Identify any issues arising in the field with respect to the relationship between the
researcher and participants, “the interpretive nature of reporting, and sensitivity
and reciprocity in the co-creating of the account” (Creswell, 2013).

•

The manner in which the culture-sharing group works must be explained (p. 263).

•

The researcher must self-disclose and relate reflexivity with respect to their role
and position in the study (p. 263).
To assess trustworthiness, I utilized two of Patton’s (2002) triangulation of

sources and triangulation of analysis in the study. My study initially utilized triangulation
of sources by examining interviews, observations and theoretical background material
(Patton, 2002). Later in the study, the triangulation of analysis consisted of the
researcher’s own analysis using a priori coding, the analysis from the participants by
allowing them to review the results of the study, and a peer review by a cohort in this
same academic program (Creswell, 2013). To ensure credibility of the research plan, I
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identified and self-assessed upfront any self-bias that could have affected the credibility
of my results in the eyes of the audience of my research.
Conclusion
My experiences thus far in establishing relationships, or access, to organizations
outside of my own has proven to be mostly positive. Both groups see the need for an
improvement of an understanding of disparate values and other organizational themes
that ultimately inform how an organization derives their processes. As a result of just
forming relationships with local humanitarian organizations there has already been a
desire shown by my military students and the aid workers to learn more about one
another. I view this as an early success that has happened simply with bringing people
together.
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Chapter 4: Results of the Study
Introduction
In chapter four I present the data collected and analyzed based on participant
interview transcripts and observation of participant reactions during the interview
process. I restate the overarching purpose of this study and supporting research questions
to be answered through the analysis of an a priori coding process. My coding
methodology took into account frequency coding, but also utilized Historical Discourse
Analysis by organizing statements by participants into “subjects” and “objects” in a
manner consistent with the Foucauldian approach of text analysis (Peräkylä, 2005, p.
871). In my analysis of the coded data collected from the interview text, I further utilized
Membership Categorization Analysis (MCA) as a basis for methodology (Peräkylä, 2005,
pp. 872-873). I applied the MCA approach by aligning the themes arising from the coded
interviews with what Peräkylä (2005) describes as “categories” for the participants and
arranging them into “category-bound activities” (p. 873). In what follows, I offer an
explanation of my pilot study, its impact on the main study, and its overarching purpose. I
also describe the actual data collection, the setting for data collection, and the participants
with their coded identifiers. Next, I restate the themes with relevant cultural dimensions
to set the foundation for the following sections, which include the results of the
interviews (the thematic statements emerging from the interview questions), the analysis
of the data collected, evidence of trustworthiness of the study, and the results of the
study. The results section addresses each research question with respect to themes.
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Pilot Study
I intended to use my study to examine the differences in organizational culture
between military officers and civilian aid workers (both governmental and
nongovernmental). The overall purpose of the study was to determine what barriers result
from an organization’s inter-subjective patterns and habits of thought and identify how
best to improve mutuality prior to a humanitarian crisis. This purpose warranted the use
of a qualitative, ethnographic means of inquiry. I collected data for my main study by
means of narrative-style interviews using open-ended questions to derive the lived
experiences of participants during times when they were responders to humanitarian
crises. Data collection was done by means of interviewing opportunistic samples of
members (retired) of each of the aforementioned groups who had experience working
with members of the culturally disparate group during a humanitarian crisis.
I did not conduct a formal pilot study, but my intended original design was to
observe members of each organization (military and civilian) separately and conduct
opportunistic interviews with the intention of deriving organizational cultural themes. I
would then observe the participants during a simulated disaster in a classroom
environment. I intended to use the observation during the simulated disaster to derive
barriers to mutuality and the development of mutuality. I would then re-interview
participants after the exercise with the intent of comparing data derived from the
observations and the pre and post exposure interviews. Thus the intent of my pilot study
was to gather organizational cultural data using non-participant observation and
opportunistic interviews. My main study evolved into a narrative, ethnographic approach
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that became necessary due to the aforementioned limitations and ethical concerns
regarding data collection in my workplace. The largest problem with my original data
collection design was the setting for data collection. The site for observation of the
interaction between members of the disparate organization was going to be in my
workplace where I am an instructor, placing me in a supervisory role of sorts. This was
untenable and discarded in favor of my main study in which data was collected in a
neutral setting.
Impact on the Main Study
My original strategy for my pilot study provided a basis for data collection, but
the means and environment for data collection was changed to that of interviewing and
observing targeted participants (based upon specific criteria) and observation in a neutral
environment. In order to glean what was most important to each participant, I took a
narrative approach to interviewing to allow for better observation of participant reactions
to the open-ended interview questions. This enhanced the initial frequency sampling,
which appeared to be skewed due to the topic of discussion (humanitarian response) and
its direct relation to the cultural dimension of humane orientation. I extracted
representative statements that aligned with themes associated with the relevant cultural
dimensions of Project Globe (2002) which in turn have a theoretical basis in the work of
Hofstede et al. (2010). These cultural dimensions were the theoretical basis for the a
priori coding I used to derive themes from and analyze the interview transcripts. The
frequencies of codes were tallied, but the narrative showed a different picture of the
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participant experiences because of the observation of participants’ organizational values
and lived experiences.
I based the data collection methodology on ethnography, which is typical of
cultural studies in the field of cultural anthropology. This involves the study of particular
groups; in this case pre-formed groups in organizations. Neyland (2008) described this
methodology as encompassing engagement with these groups using questions that
determine how the group operates, deriving the values-based meanings regarding
membership, and evaluating the impact of change on the group (Neyland, 2008). The
practice of studying cultural groups has been expanded over the years from focusing on
societies, to focusing on organizations because ethnography has been deemed effective in
studying the day-to-day activities and values (Neyland, 2008). The overall ethnographic
strategy for this study and its analysis was to determine what focal point or subsets
thereof brings people together in each organization being studied and assess these
elements using what Neyland (2008) describes as a narrative ethnography using
unstructured practical questions. A narrative approach using practical questions as a
strategy requires interaction between the researcher and participant through negotiation
and the formation of a relationship of sorts, and the use of questions that “involve a clear
emphasis on using the strategy as a process for bringing people together” (Neyland, 2008,
pp, 35-36).
The pilot study of informal, non-participant observation of members of both
organizations was intended to shape the main study by providing a foundation for
interorganizational cultural disparities. This was to be done by simple observation of
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members of each organization as a course of casual visits (tours of facilities, attendance
at conferences and lectures), but I concluded that I needed a more participative approach
in order to gleen out organizational values. I adapted the pilot study by adhering to the
requirements of the Institutional Research Board and recruited participants from each
organization that met specific requirements regarding experience both in their parent
organization and in working with the disparate organization. I gained a richer array of
data by means of engaging one on one with each participant after forming a rapport for
open conversation and the observation of nonverbal cues. Essentially, I retained the
ethnographic approach, but eliminated observation and interviewing of participants in the
workplace.
Setting of the Study
I work within a military organization as a faculty member. This personal factor
placed me in a position of authority over potential participants within my work place so I
did not utilize my workplace as a setting for participant recruitment or interviews.
Additionally, I am a retired military officer. This factor has the potential to influence my
interpretation of the data. In order to compensate for this factor, I have formed
relationships with local NGOs and have become immersed in their organizations as a
volunteer. This has effectively provided me with a wider scope of organizational
understanding of nonmilitary organizations.
Purpose of the Study
My study aimed to improve cultural awareness between culturally disparate
organizations and was designed to help those organizations avoid some of the initial
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chaos at the outset of a crisis. Crisis response efforts are inherently chaotic in nature, but
developing an earlier understanding of the unique attributes of a separate organization in
advance has the potential to improve the swiftness and effectiveness of crisis response.
In this study, I sought to determine the value of organizational cultural
understanding between disparate organizations prior to crisis response. Research has been
conducted on relationships and effectiveness within cultures and between cultures in
humanitarian and peace operations, but a specific study and analysis of the often
subjective observations of one organization’s perceptions of a disparate organization’s
culture has not been conducted. This study and resulting analysis was accomplished by
means of focused, narrative-style interviews of a variety of participants of real world
disaster relief operations, and was aimed at increasing cross-cultural effectiveness prior to
and during a crisis event.
I examined the elements essential to collaborative cooperation between
organizations with differing organizational cultures and mandates, and sought to
determine whether a common purpose outweighs cultural differences. Many studies have
been conducted regarding organizational culture and leadership (Schein, 2010) and the
interrelationship between the organization’s values (how things should be) and its
organizational practices (how things are) (House, Javidan, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002).
These prescribed cross-cultural organizational values, defined by Project GLOBE as
applied to the competing values framework, defined the theoretical basis for this study.
Additionally, this study builds on a study conducted at the U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College that utilized the Competing Values Framework. The recent
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study examined the cultural differences between Department of State employees and
Department of Defense military officers in an effort to explore how “these related to
conducting integrated and complementary efforts in national security” (Davis &
Paparone, 2012).
Research Questions
I used each of these three research questions to undergird a series of interview
questions and a practice of participant observation that I employed to enrich data
collection.
RQ1: How do the organizations being examined differ with respect to a
description of the values associated with organizational culture and which values
are most important to the individual groups?
RQ2: What patterns or themes emerge in terms of barriers to mutuality when
analyzing organizational cultural differences?
RQ3: How do the intrinsic value descriptions of organizational culture result in
barrier mitigation between United States military and humanitarian aid workers
belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations?
Data Collection and Flow – Interviews and Observation
Narrative-style, loosely structured interviews were conducted with participants
who were recruited based upon criterion sampling. All participant interviews were
safeguarded in a locked container with their identities kept confidential, and identifying
codes kept in a separate, locked container. The narrative-style was chosen to allow for a
deeper analysis that was based upon personal, lived experiences of responding to a
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humanitarian crisis and working with members of culturally disparate groups. I deemed it
important for them to have the time and full opportunity to relate their own story of the
crisis event.
I conducted loosely structured interviews using open-ended questions, each one
being linked to my research questions with the results being linked to the cultural
dimensions of an appropriate selection of a priori ideas from Project GLOBE’s nine
cultural dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, power distance, societal collectivism, ingroup collectivism, gender egalitarianism, assertiveness, future orientation, performance
orientation, and humane orientation) (House et al., 2002, p. 3). Project GLOBE expanded
upon the cultural dimensions described by Hofstede et al. which they used as a theoretical
basis for diagnosing the uniqueness of cultural groups. I used each cultural dimension to
develop a theme for the coding and analysis of participant responses. This practice is
described by Murchison (2010) as a starting list from which to derive codes for the record
of the ethnographic study and ultimately draw the cultural lanscape of the organizations
being studied (p. 178). The interview protocols may be found in appendix A. Participants
were coded with respect to their occupation during their experience conducting
humanitarian assistance in order to maintain anonymity. These are as follows:
MO: United States military officer
CAG: Civilian Aid Worker U.S. Federal Government Employee
CAP: Civilian Aid Worker Private (nongovernmental organization employee)
The participants were also observed as they related their experiences in
conducting crisis response activities where they were forced to work collaboratively and
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cooperatively with organizations that are culturally different. I recorded my observations
using Janesick’s (2011) journaling procedures to determine the existence of
organizational inter-subjective patterns and habits of thought and how relationships
change and evolve into mutuality. Each statement, word or phrase relating the
aforementioned cultural dimensions are annotated with side notes and the frequency of
these are tallied up for each question with a negative sign indicating that there existed a
lack of a certain cultural dimension for either type of organization. It must be noted here
that observation of participants with respect to the time spent on interview questions and
the amount of detail (particularly their accounts of example situations the encountered in
the field) where deemed to outweigh the simple tallying of frequency coding. This is due
to the nature of the discussion and the fact that some of the cultural dimensions arose
more frequently due to the topic of humanitarian response (such as humane orientation).
Interview Questions
Each interview question is linked back to one or more research questions as
depicted in table 1. The answers were coded with respect to the cultural themes listed
next to each interview question in table 1. Observation was needed to complement the
discussion during the narrative interviews as it allowed the researcher to determine if the
participant was discussing a negative or positive existence of a cultural dimension in their
organization and the culturally disparate organization.
Question 1 (IQ1): What do you think makes your organization successful? What
are you proud of with respect to your organization? How does the organization
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view risk? (Uncertainty avoidance, societal collectivism, in-group collectivism,
future orientation, performance orientation, humane orientation)
Question 2 (IQ2): What makes the leadership in your organization effective in
producing organizational and public value? Do you personally feel empowered by
your leadership? (Uncertainty avoidance, power distance, societal collectivism,
in-group collectivism, assertiveness, future orientation, performance orientation,
humane orientation)
Question 3 (IQ3): How are decisions made in your organization? (Power distance,
in-group collectivism, societal collectivism, humane orientation)
Question 4 (IQ4): How often have you worked with members of organization y?
What is your opinion of organization y? (Uncertainty avoidance, power distance,
societal collectivism, in-group collectivism, assertiveness, future orientation,
humane orientation)
Question 5 (IQ5): What value do you see in working with organization y?
(Uncertainty avoidance, societal collectivism, assertiveness, future orientation,
performance orientation, humane orientation).
Question 6 (IQ6): Do you think that barriers exist between your organization x
and organization y that affect working relationships? (Uncertainty avoidance,
power distance, societal collectivism, in-group collectivism, assertiveness, future
orientation, performance orientation, humane orientation).
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The following table was used to extract relevant data from observation and
interviews for coding and data analysis using the cultural themes. It will ultimately allow
me to answer my research questions based upon my derived emic.
Table 2
Data Collection Linkage
Interview Question Link to RQ
IQ1
IQ2
IQ3
IQ4
IQ5
IQ6

Cultural Dimension

Derived Theme (CD-Based)

RQ1, RQ2
CD1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9
RQ1, RQ2
CD1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9
RQ1
CD2, 4, 9
RQ1, RQ2, RQ3 CD3, 6, 7, 9
RQ2, RQ3
CD3, 7, 8, 9
RQ2, RQ3
CD1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9

Note. Not all cultural dimensions were deemed applicable to this study. This is annotated
next to cultural dimensions not applicable in the list below. Each cultural dimension is
described in a context that matches its definition with associated key words and phrases
considered synonymous with the cultural dimension.

Cultural Dimensions
The following is a list of the cultural dimensions that I used to derive themes from
participant statements and observation. The associated definitions from my theoretical
basis (House, et al, 2002) are provided for clarity of meaning:
Cultural Dimension 1 (CD1) uncertainty avoidance: “The extent to which
members of an organization or society strive to avoid uncertainty by reliance on
social norms, rituals, and bureaucratic practices to alleviate the unpredictability of
future events” (p. 5)
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Cultural Dimension 2 (CD2) power distance: “The degree to which members of
an organization or society expect and agree that power should be equally shared”
(p. 5)
Cultural Dimension 3 (CD3) societal collectivism: “The degree to which
organizational and societal institutional practices encourage and reward collective
distribution of resources and collective action” (p. 5)
Cultural Dimension 4 (CD4) in-group collectivism: “The degree to which
individuals express pride, loyalty and cohesiveness in their organizations or
families” (p. 5)
Cultural Dimension 5 (CD5) gender egalitarianism (not applicable): “The extent
to which an organization or a society minimizes gender role differences and
gender discrimination” (p. 5)
Cultural Dimension 6 (CD6) assertiveness: “The degree to which individuals in
organizations or societies are assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in social
relationships” (p. 6)
Cultural Dimension 7 (CD7) future orientation: “The degree to which individuals
in organizations or societies engage in future-oriented behaviors such as planning,
investing in the future, and delaying gratification” (p. 6)
Cultural Dimension 8 (CD8) performance orientation: “The extent to which an
organization or society encourages and rewards group members for performance
improvement and excellence” (p. 6)
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Cultural Dimension 9 (CD9) humane orientation: “The degree to which
individuals in organizations or societies encourage and reward individuals for
being fair, altruistic, friendly, generous, caring, and kind to others” (p. 6)
Participant Interview Results
Four participants were interviewed in this study. They were recruited based upon
their experience having worked with the culturally disparate organization during
humanitarian crisis response and based upon their large amount of personal experience in
leadership roles in these types of operations. Each participant had a minimum of 30 years
of experience in their respective organization. Two participants were from civilian aid
organizations (one governmental and one nongovernmental). The two other participants
were senior United States military officers. Interview protocol, observation protocol, and
complete interview transcripts are found in appendices one through six.
Participant observation was conducted during the interviews in order to gain more
insight with respect to items that influence organizational culture that are outside of the
aforementioned cultural dimensions. The most frequently noted items in this sense were
the role of political implications on organizational processes, attitudes and other
attributes, as well as the influence of the greater societal culture on the organizations
values. Of note, all participants voluntarily emphasized the need for better inter-cultural
understanding of disparate response organizations. It can be inferred that this was due to
the participants having been provided the purpose of the study in advance, but more
importantly was due to the participants’ own lived experiences and attitudes.
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Analysis of Data Collected
I organized the data collected from the four participants into themes related to
each cultural dimension. These themes were derived from the interpretive coding of each
interview question. I then tied these themes to each one of the three research questions in
order to tie the data collected and analyzed back to the purpose of the study. Examples of
participant statements related to the research questions are provided below.
RQ1: How do the organizations being examined differ with respect to a
description of the values associated with organizational culture and which values
are most important to the individual groups?
RQ2: What patterns or themes emerge in terms of barriers to mutuality when
analyzing organizational cultural differences?
RQ3: How do the intrinsic value descriptions of organizational culture result in
barrier mitigation between United States military and humanitarian aid workers
belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations?
Interview Question One
Question 1 (IQ1): What do you think makes your organization successful? What
are you proud of with respect to your organization? How does the organization view risk?
(Uncertainty avoidance, societal collectivism, in-group collectivism, future orientation,
performance orientation, humane orientation).
Previous research on military culture indicate that the military values training,
cohesion and mission accomplishment. These values, along with a negative view of
adhocracy are reflected in the answers to interview question one, both from the military
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participants and the civilian aid worker participants in discussing their view of the
military. The values of training and mission accomplishment are reflective of a high
degree of Cultural Dimension 8 (CD8) performance orientation: “The extent to which an
organization or society encourages and rewards group members for performance
improvement and excellence” (House, et al., 2002, p. 6). Participant MO1’s statement is
demonstrative of this organizational value “We had no luxury of early warning. We had
to rely on our training." His additional statement "It was...that the experience of the
Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines and leaders and their adaptability that ability to be
able to quickly recognize environment and adapt from their previous experiences, their
training that had served them extremely well obviously during peace and war proved to
be essential" indicates that this value of training and experience (CD8) allowed for them
to overcome the adhocracy of the unfolding crisis. So, essentially, the previous research
of Davis and Paparone (2012) supports the value of mission accomplishment, but in the
face of human suffering the military dislike for adhocracy (CD1–uncertainty avoidance –
is compensated for by performance orientation (through training and experience in their
core competency). It must also be noted here that both military officers felt that saving
lives and relieving human suffering was paramount (CD9-humane orientation) and is
supported by what as Kapucu (2009) describes an ability to adapt to the environment
based upon needs.
Interestingly, this question elicited a response from participant CAP with
reference to experience working with the military which indicated differences in power
distance between the two organizations being studied. Participant CAP stated "The
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military tend to want to give us orders to do things and that, I will tell you, is not the way
to win friends and influence civilians. And where we need to discuss what we're going to
do and why we are going to do it, the military has limitations as far as their mission
statement." This view indicates that civilian aid workers from private organizations view
the military as having a short power distance (I have control of the immediate things
around me) versus a long power distance (I need to wait to be told what to do with
respect to decisions and actions). This view, however, is contra-indicated in other
statements in the interview by civilian aid workers as they indicated that the military is
hierarchical (long power distance) as opposed to civilian aid organizations being
classified as “collaborative” and organizationally “flatter”. This observation is supported
by Professor Roberts’ 2010 study of the working relationships between the military and
NGOs that indicated that the military values “organizational structures that reinforce
hierarchical authority, clearly defined of command and control relationships, and rules of
engagement that are clearly defined to ensure accountability to policy makers” (Roberts,
2010, p. 213).
The answers examining civilian aid worker culture provided by participants to
interview question one are closely correlated with the organizational values described in
Roberts’ 2010 article “Spanning "Bleeding" Boundaries: Humanitarianism, NGOs, and
the Civilian-Military Nexus in the Post-Cold War Era” and Hilhorst and Schmiemann’s
(2002) study of how internationally recognized humanitarian principles influence the
organizational culture of NGOs. It must be noted here that the cultural dimension of
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humane orientation (CD9) showed a frequent occurrence due to the nature of the
discussion and the nature of the study.
One statement from participant CAG indicated a similar value of mission
accomplishment correlating somewhat to CD8 (performance orientation). The participant
stated "I think what makes it successful really is the willingness of the people that work
there to take on the mandate, and it has a unique mandate. And therefore I think that is
why some people are willing to give a lot extra...for the mandate to work on humanitarian
assistance type activities." This indicates a strong value in accomplishing the
organization’s mission and indicates a strong degree of humanitarianism (CD9–which is
essentially the organizations overarching mandate.
Power distance was also a strong theme of discussion as noted through
observations of reactions and strong statements by civilian aid worker participants.
Participant CAP stated “One of the difficulties in nonmilitary organizations and military
organizations working together is that very often we come from very different cultures,
very different backgrounds, and very different styles. Particularly in leadership, we are
much more horizontal in our organization structure than vertical as is the military" and
"we are much more participative…we do things by consensus, the military generally does
things by orders and you don't discuss the order you just salute smartly and do it, where if
we don't think it's appropriate we are just as likely to say "well that's not a very good idea
because If we did it this way it would be different and in my experience." This is
supported, as in the case of the analysis of the military side of the answers to this
interview question by the research by Roberts (2010) and the study conducted by Hilhorst
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and Schmiemann (2002) indicating values of intra organizational collaboration,
participation, and independent thought in civilian aid organizations. These values show a
high degree of short power distance CD2 (empowerment of the organization’s members
when they are in the field) and CD4 (in-group collectivism). Power distance relates to
individual empowerment and to the nature of an organization’s leadership and how that
leadership relates to subordinates in an organization. This is to be analyzed in interview
question 2.
Interview Question Two
Question 2 (IQ2): What makes the leadership in your organization effective in
producing organizational and public value? Do you personally feel empowered by your
leadership? (Uncertainty avoidance, power distance, societal collectivism, in-group
collectivism, assertiveness, future orientation, performance orientation, humane
orientation)
Participants from both the military and from civilian aid organization felt a strong
sense of empowerment within their respective organizations. This may very well be due
to each participant’s respective time working for their organization (all had at least 30
years working for their organization). My observation here is that this in-group
collectivism found in statements from both military and civilian aid organizations is
indicative of inter-subjective behavior and can be a cause of a lack of coordination
efforts. I derive from this a theme of both of these organizations being “closed
communities” due to their members spending long periods of time, isolated from the dayto-day family and friends at home while operating in austere environments. The result of
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this is inter-subjective behavior and patterns of thought, or essentially the group “closing
ranks” to the point of not feeling positive about working with a culturally disparate
group. This essentially answers my Research Question RQ2 – What patterns or themes
emerge in terms of barriers to mutuality when analyzing organizational cultural
differences? This answer to RQ2 is supported by Roberts (2010) study that found that
NGO cultural attributes include (and are not limited to): organizational mandates are to
be fulfilled by staying autonomous, neutral, and impartial, taking instructions and being
tasked by outside organizations is generally not done, they value their freedom of
operations and are thus are suspicious of attempts to organize or integrate with others (p.
213).
Participant MO2 stated "I think you can't isolate the leadership of an organization
without being cognizant of the role that higher headquarters plays, if you will. I think our
leadership had a great deal to do with our success by being cohesive. The core of that
initial Joint Task Force and then Combined Support Force was the XXX staff which was
a very cohesive organization. They had planned and trained together extensively and it
was pretty comfortable bringing in individual augments into the staff from the other
services. Because it was a very competent organization, folks could come in and play a
role quickly." This statement is again supported by Kirke’s 2010 research “Military
Cohesion, Culture and Social Psychology” and his findings that military cohesion is a
core cultural aspect of collectivism in the military. This statement and supporting
research indicates that when asked about leadership and empowerment, the military
values in-group collectivism (CD4) as a core cultural dimension. They are thus what
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Hilhorst and Schmiemann (2010) describe as a closed organization due to this cohesion
developed over time by the members becoming each other’s social system in the absence
of family and friends during long periods of time away from home.
The core mission of the military and its ability to adapt to the environment was
viewed by participant MO2 as the means that military leadership provides public value.
He stated "I think it is just that in a sense our military's core mission is to defend the
nation against all enemies foreign and domestic. I think that when we are called upon to
do humanitarian and disaster response missions and while we don't necessarily train for
that mission, we are able to use those capabilities that we do have in appropriate ways to
respond in the interest of the United States. So I think Haiti was a great example of how
we proved how effectively we can do that." It can be argued here that this is a prime
example of a strong value of CD8 (performance orientation) which is supported by
Wilson’s (2008) research “Defining Military Culture” in which he describes the modern
military as being more professional in nature and more reflective of society as a whole.
This is as opposed to previous beliefs that the military was merely a reflection of the
aristocracy (Wilson, 2008). My observation is that in the case of the Officer Core, this
was the case in earlier times in history.
The civilian aid workers also indicated a strong degree of empowerment (short
power distance–CD2). But, as is in the case of the military, they do have a “master”
driving what their actions and decisions in the field. Participant CAP discussed this
element by telling me that, although private volunteer organizations are not political, their
actions are constrained by the grants that they have written in order to gain financing
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from sponsors. Likewise, the military is constrained by laws and is, in the case of the
United States, under the control of civilian government officials. Participant CAP stated
"When I was running an organization in a country I had, within the bounds of what I was
there to do, I had pretty much a free reign. That didn't mean it was laissez faire, I had to
check back occasionally but they were a long way away and decisions had to be made on
the field. I mean in the situation at the time, you couldn't be fooling around with waiting
24 to 48 hours to get a decision from somebody when the situation needs to be dealt with
right now. So the country director has a good deal of leeway within certain parameters.
We can't just go off and start new programs just because we want to." This statement
indicates a limit on power distance, but she also stated "The country director is the
commanding officer and has a good deal of discretion” which is supported by Hilhorst
and Schmiemann’s 2002 study of NGOs and finding that they value freedom and
autonomy. Roberts’s (2010) research also found that NGOs value the freedom to make
decisions in complex field conditions.
Interview Question Three
Question 3 (IQ3): How are decisions made in your organization? (Power distance,
in-group collectivism, societal collectivism, humane orientation)
The largest thematic difference between the culture sharing groups here was a
“flat” versus a hierarchical group. This is supported by Roberts' (2010) assessment of
military culture is described as having organizational structures that reinforce hierarchical
authority and clearly defined of command and control relationships. It is also supported
by the observation that the interviewees in Hilhorst and Schmiemann's 2002 study
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indicated a positive view of the “un-bureaucratic” nature of the organization during their
work conducting humanitarian assistance, specifically being empowered with
responsibility and flexibility of decision-making and actions (p. 497). They indicated that
they like the “horizontal” nature of the organization; un-bureaucratic and independent (p.
497). This theme was resonant throughout the interviews and indicates a strong
difference in CD2–power distance. The civilian aid workers describe a value of a shorter
power distance (more empowerment in the field) while the military officers describe
taking direction from higher headquarters for the higher levels of decision making. It
must be noted here, however, that a difference in observed values – hierarchical versus
“flat” only goes so far with respect to reality. Specifically, the military is directed by
national interests while NGOs actions are driven by donor requirements.
This observation, or theme, of organizational differences essentially answers my
Research Question One (RQ1): How do the organizations being examined differ with
respect to a description of the values associated with organizational culture and which
values are most important to the individual groups? The military as an organization
values hierarchy and thus clearly defined command and control relationships and NGOs
value collaboration and empowerment on the ground. However, during the interviews, all
participants indicated they were empowered at the tactical (field) level to make decisions.
Of note, participant CAG is a civilian humanitarian aid worker, but works for a
governmental organization, thus indicating a hybrid of results between the military and
civilian aid groups. His statement is indicative of this: "Sometimes, I think that
overall…there are high profile activities that are sometimes overshadowed by politics
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rather than mission – and that’s just real world…however, with that said, there are many
humanitarian professionals within that organization that really do look at a decision or an
activity and approach it from a humanitarian professional standpoint, and approach it
from that. I would say that first and foremost, overall the staff are humanitarian
professionals first and deal with the politics secondarily.” This indicates a strong degree
of CD9 (humane orientation) as a value that is considered foremost even in an
organization whose actions can be impacted by political decisions.
Accordingly, the actions and decisions of the US military driven by national
interests and therefor are political as well. Kinetic military actions are sometimes referred
to as “violent politics”. Participant MO1 indicates a large power distance when making a
decision to employ the military, but, much like civilian aid organizations decisions on the
ground are not so driven by what is going on in Washington. When asked how decisions
are made in his organization, he stated “the way that I would characterize it is most
decisions are made at the top-what you are going to do, what the priorities are, and what
the direction are made at the top. But the execution is very decentralized.”
Civilian aid organizations indicated a higher focus on sustainability in the
population that they are rendering aid to. Their responses tended to be more long term
focused indicating a strong value in CD7-future orientation and CD3–societal
collectivism. Participant CAP stated "We have more involvement, and I think I can make
this a blanket statement, we have more involvement with the people we are there to serve
than the military. We work with the local government if there is one. We work with the
local people. We don't tell them what they need. We asked what they have, what they
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need, what we can bring, what are their priorities and we negotiate with them if we don't
agree with their priorities." This value essentially equates to “if you give a man a fish, he
will eat for a day. If you teach a man to fish, he will eat for a lifetime”. The inherent
theme derived here of short term versus long term focus with respect to humanitarian
intervention provides another indicated cultural disparity between civilian aid
organizations and the military. This theme adds more depth to my answer to RQ1 which
revolves around organizational differences. Essentially, the military is in a supporting
role (in general) during humanitarian crises and needs to provide this support quickly to
the main effort (civilian aid organizations) so that the military can return to its core
competency. Civilian aid workers are focused on sustainability, thereby enabling the
affected population and not making them dependent upon outsiders.
Interview Question Four
Question 4 (IQ4): How often have you worked with members of organization y?
What is your opinion of organization y? (Uncertainty avoidance, power distance, societal
collectivism, in-group collectivism, assertiveness, future orientation, humane orientation)
The value in answering my research questions with the data and themes derived
from this interview question was found more in the answer to the second part of the
question regarding the participant’s opinion of the other organization. This is supported
by elements of relational theory by applying Historical Discourse Analysis by organizing
statements by participants and organizing them into “subjects” and “objects” in a manner
consistent with the Foucauldian approach of text analysis (Peräkylä, 2005, p. 871).
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Participant CAG was asked about his opinion of the military. His response
indicated a high degree of assertiveness (CD5) in his description of certain personalities
in the military being “type A”. He also indicated a high uncertainty avoidance (CD1)
when describing the military in his discussion that when encountering a foreign problem
set, they revert back to their training. He stated: "They understand kinetic. When they get
into a new operational environment, an environment which they are not familiar with,
two things occur: One is because many of them come from a type A personality where
they are given a problem set and look for a solution-when they see a problem set outside
of their solution set – some people will make the mistake of thinking that they know best
and execute and fix and come up with a solution set. Therefore their solutions may be
short-sighted and incomplete." Likewise, participant CAP stated “the military come in
and do what they are told to do. I don't mean to be disrespectful-but regardless of what
the population wants." This is somewhat supported by Davis and Paparone’s 2012 study
their findings of military culture that demonstrated a view that adhocracy, being
innovative and not staying with the norm was bad and that their organizational culture is
characterized by a strong sense of mission accomplishment (market value) and, to a lesser
degree a hierarchical value (pp. 34-36).
Similarities exist between the military and civilian aid organizations with respect
to power distance. Participant CAP explained earlier in the interview that their actions
(NGOs in this case) are driven by what their donors and sponsors have agreed to give
them money for in the grant proposals submitted by the organization. Participant MO1
also related this similarity by stating "most of them, particularly the larger ones have a
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Board of Directors back in the United States who are putting constraints on them just like
our Department of Defense and Department of State put constraints on us. So, they don't
just have leeway to do just what they'd like to on the ground." This is somewhat contrary
to Hilhorst and Schmiemann’s 2002 interviews finding that the most resonant values
emerging from the NGO interviews were found to be the un-bureaucratic attitude and the
focus on emergency relief (p. 497). This is also contrary to Roberts (2010) finding that
one of their key attributes being that their organizational structures tend to be
decentralized with respect to authority and decision making. This decentralization
enables them to quickly adapt as needed while conducting field level operations in
austere operating conditions (p. 213). I would like to state here that an organization’s
values (in this case a long power distance (CD2) between workers in the field executing
operations and their headquarters) may not always reflect what actually happens due to
fiscal needs.
Both military officers had a high opinion of civilian aid organizations and,
likewise the civilian aid organizations valued the US military and its professionalized
capabilities that support crisis response. Participant MO1 described civilian aid
organizations as having a high degree of experience (CD8-performance orientation) and
humane orientation–CD9. He stated "I didn't run into too many people that were doing
that because they wanted to become millionaires. So I think their motivations are very
pure because they are doing it because they generally really want to help people. Many of
them have a lot of experience, sort of bounce around that world in different places." He
further stated "I think that as a group and as people who volunteer their services, work in
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NGOs that are humanitarian aid type organizations, do it because they have a real passion
for it and really want to help people." This is supported by Hilhorst & Schmiemann’s
2002 findings that humanitarian principles define aid worker values (p.491); these
humanitarian principles being humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary
service, unity and universality (ICRC, 2014).
The emerging themes from IQ4, part two regarding the participant opinions of the
alternate cultural group lead to answers to my third research question, RQ3–How do the
intrinsic value descriptions of organizational culture result in barrier mitigation between
United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and
nongovernmental organizations? Participant MO2 felt strongly about building better
relationships between the two organizational types prior to a crisis. He stated “I think that
they need to train together (referring to the military and aid organizations). There needs
to be an adjustment in the personnel system that will put them in positions at the Joint
Forces Staff College or any of the (military) service command and staff colleges or war
colleges to have a much better sense and greater experience in deliberate planning and a
better understanding of the (military) services." The civilian aid worker participants
expressed similar sentiments. This indicates a theme, derived by participant statements
and researcher observation of a need for mutuality. This is supported by Roberts’ 2010
purposeful research article “Spanning "Bleeding" Boundaries: Humanitarianism, NGOs,
and the Civilian-Military Nexus in the Post-Cold War Era” which examined the
organizational cultures of the military and international NGOs in order determine “how
best to structure for effectiveness the increasingly vital peacekeeping and humanitarian
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efforts of the military and NGOs in failing or failed states and combat zones around the
world” (p. 212). A secondary theme, also supported by this article, is that both
organizations value what the other brings to crisis response.
Interview Question Five
Question 5 (IQ5): What value do you see in working with organization y?
(Uncertainty avoidance, societal collectivism, assertiveness, future orientation,
performance orientation, humane orientation).
A stated in the results of interview question four, both organizations recognize
and value the capabilities and abilities of the disparate cultural group. This is a strong
theme relating to CD8–performance orientation, and supports answering my third
research question; RQ3–How do the intrinsic value descriptions of organizational culture
result in barrier mitigation between United States military and humanitarian aid workers
belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations? It must be noted here
that all participants were observed to have a strong desire for better inter organizational
understanding between the two groups. All participants were most passionate about this
particular area of the need for mutuality as could be observed by their spending extra
time describing in detail personal experiences with actual cases of challenges to working
together and misunderstandings. Getting past these misunderstandings of one another’s
organizational culture in order to more effectively alleviate human suffering was a
resonant theme throughout all interviews.
Participant CAP responded to this interview question by demonstrating a value in
the military’s capabilities and strengths that could be used to support her organization in a
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crisis. She stated "the military are essential to get things done. But also security,
communications. Those are the big ones logistics, security, and communications-lift.
Those are the things that we cannot do nearly as well as the military does. We do not
have the resources, usually. It is a skill. The military have people who do this all the
time." This indicates a theme that some of the core competencies of the military can be
translated into non kinetic operational activities, thus further answering research question
three regarding intrinsic value descriptions of organizational culture result in barrier
mitigation between United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to
governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Participant CAG viewed the military
as a complementary organization to his if they were better aware of the problem set
presented to them that was outside of their standard role. He stated “in working with them
and engaging them, as I said, in this new problem set, the value-added is that if we can
improve their knowledge set and their understanding of handling that problem set the
value-added is that they can be more efficient and help my organization to meet its goals,
its mandate and that is key, as the military would say, we like them to become a force
multiplier for humanitarian assistance." His statement supports what amounts to an
overarching theme of mutuality through mutual appreciation.
The participants therefore indicated value in working together but not necessarily
losing their autonomy. Roberts' 2010 study found that cultural values of civilian aid
organizations reflected: organizational mandates are to be fulfilled by staying
autonomous, neutral, and impartial, taking instructions and being tasked by outside
organizations is generally not done, they value their freedom of operations and are thus
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are suspicious of attempts to organize or integrate with others (p. 213). Going back to
participant CAP’s response to interview question one, she felt strongly about these values
by stating "the military tend to want to give us orders to do things and that, I will tell you,
is not the way to win friends and influence civilians. And where we need to discuss what
we're going to do and why we are going to do it, the military has limitations as far as their
mission statement."
The military officers interviewed mirrored this strong sentiment of the value and
professional expertise of civilian aid organizations. Participant MO2 stated "the value is
that those folks bring tremendous expertise. The World Health Organization brings
expertise in preventing epidemics. They have tremendous capability from a public health
perspective that is not resident in military organizations. World Food Program; the
military can handout yellow bagged MREs and high energy biscuits but the reality is that
the World Food Program brings experience in terms of feeding populations that is
absolutely nonexistent in military organizations." Essentially, the mutual feeling is that
neither organization can accomplish humanitarian assistance alone, but both cultural
groups need to respect one another’s values and appreciate one another’s capabilities.
Interview Question Six
Question 6 (IQ6): Do you think that barriers exist between your organization x
and organization y that affect working relationships? (Uncertainty avoidance, power
distance, societal collectivism, in-group collectivism, assertiveness, future orientation,
performance orientation, humane orientation).
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The emerging themes regarding barriers affecting working relationships are based
upon inter organizational misunderstandings and a strong desire for unity of effort
between disparate response organizations. Participant MO2 stated “I think that they (the
barriers) are based on a lack of understanding on both sides about what the mission is.
There are probably some preconceived notions on both sides of the relationship that aren't
totally correct, but they are there. It takes some time to knock down those barriers." He
further stated "I think that the more that you can put these organizations together, whether
it is in the schoolhouse or planning exercises, training together is the key to breaking
down those barriers of stereotyping to not really understanding each other's capabilities
and frankly how you can take some very disparate capabilities and how the pieces fit
together and have a synergistic effort." To add to this participant MO1 stated “I think
we've got to figure out how to have those kind of relationships so when we do have to
work together we can do it in a better collaborative way and make it more effective.” The
word collaborative is a key element as civilian aid organizations desire collaboration as
opposed to being tasked by outside organizations or organized or integrated with others
(Roberts, 2010, p. 213).
Participant CAG stated "I think the barrier really is the lack of understanding. I
think that is one of the big ones. I think that if barrier can be chipped away at, the two
organizations can work together more effectively." Participant CAG also described his
personal observations in the Haiti earthquake response emphasized the need to break
down barriers between the military and civilian aid organizations. He added "my
organization is trying to push to the military is that unity of effort and that it has to be a
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unity of effort among all organizations to be effective. It can’ be parallel efforts and I will
just use Haiti as an example – there were too many examples of parallel efforts as
opposed to unity of effort across the board, which led to inefficiencies in that response." I
also observed that the civilian aid workers showed an understanding of military
vernacular. The military participants did not seem to use civilian aid organization
vernacular.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
I needed to characterize each participant with a code and that allowed me to
discern who they are and what characteristics they possess. This allowed me to provide
the results of the study to participants to aid me as the researcher with checking for the
validity of my data prior to publishing to results.
For quality assurance and transferability of this narrative ethnographic study, I
used Creswell’s (2013, pp. 262-263) suggested questions to assess the quality of the
study quality as the actual study has not yet competed been completed. Specifically:
•

The researcher must clearly identify the culture-sharing groups to be studied (p.
263). The culture sharing groups in this study were military officers and civilian
aid workers with at least 30 years of experience in their field and experience
working with the alternate culture sharing group during a crisis event.

•

The cultural themes to be studied must be specified (p. 263). In this case the
theoretical framework will be used to observe the etic of the culture-sharing
groups. This are stated earlier as Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions as expanded by
Project GLOBE which were used as the basis for coding and analysis of the etic.
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•

The culture group must be clearly described (p. 263). The group had at least 30
years of experience in their field and experience working with the alternate
culture sharing group during a crisis event.

•

Cultural themes will be identified and derived after applying the theoretical
framework, thus leading to the ultimate emic (p. 263). The emerging cultural
themes from each interview question are described in the analysis section of this
chapter. They were derived from participant statements, researcher observations
and were supported by previous scholarly research.

•

Identify any issues arising in the field with respect to the relationship between the
researcher and participants, “the interpretive nature of reporting, and sensitivity
and reciprocity in the co-creating of the account” (Creswell, 2013). My original
research plan consisted of interviews and observation of students in my
workplace. This was not a viable option due to my leadership position as their
faculty. I recruited and interviewed members of the relevant culture sharing
groups who were both retired and from outside of my work organization.

•

The manner in which the culture-sharing group works must be explained (p. 263).
Each culture sharing group works together in often austere and or isolated settings
for varying periods of time. One group consists of civilian aid workers whose
charter it is to provide humanitarian assistance. The other group consists of
military officers whose charter it is to support and defend the Constitution of the
United States against all enemies both foreign and domestic.
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•

The researcher must self-disclose and relate reflexivity with respect to their role
and position in the study (p. 263). My personal role and process in this study was
to continually reflect upon and keep in mind my objective of determining my
emic with respect to the cultural dimensions being observed for existing themes.
These themes, amounting to my emic, ultimately reflected upon and answered my
research questions.
To assess trustworthiness, I utilized two of Patton’s (2002) triangulation of

sources and triangulation of analysis in the study. My study initially utilized triangulation
of sources by examining interviews, observations and background material from previous
scholarly research (Patton, 2002). Each finding regarding a strong presence of a particular
cultural dimension from resultant analysis of data collected was correlated to a related
study described in my literature review and methodology chapters. Later in the study, the
triangulation of analysis consisted of my own analysis using a priori coding, the analysis
from the participants by allowing them to review the results of the study, and a peer
review by a cohort in this same academic program (Creswell, 2013).
To ensure credibility of the research plan, I identified and self-assessed upfront
any self-bias that could have affected the credibility of my results in the eyes of the
audience of my research. I am a retired military officer and had to keep this potential bias
in mind when determining my emic of the cultural analysis of the culture sharing groups.
My primary method of avoiding my identification too much with the military group was
to form ongoing professional relationships with some local NGOs and with members of
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civilian governmental aid organizations. I strongly believe that this gave me a higher
degree of open-mindedness.
Results
The overarching purpose of my study was to determine what barriers exist
between these two organizations and, ultimately to identify modes for improving
mutuality among disparate crisis responders prior to a humanitarian crisis. In this section
supporting research questions are answered or addressed supported by the previously
discussed interview question analysis utilizing a priori coding. My coding methodology
took into account frequency coding, but more effectively utilized Historical Discourse
Analysis (HDA). I found that HDA was more relevant to relational theory and I utilized it
by organizing statements by participants and organizing them into “subjects” and
“objects” in a manner consistent with the Foucauldian approach of text analysis
(Peräkylä, 2005, p. 871). The analysis of the coded data collected from the interview text
further utilized Membership Categorization Analysis (MCA) as a basis for methodology
(Peräkylä, 2005, pp. 872-873). I applied the MCA approach by aligning the themes
arising from the coded interviews with what Peräkylä (2005) describes as categories for
the participants and arranging them into “category-bound activities” (p. 873).
My results section addresses each research question with respect to themes. Each
of the three research questions were analyzed and answered by deriving themes from the
previously described interview questions and through participant observation to enrich
data collection. These themes are supported by existing research as described both below
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and in the analysis of data section where I describe the experience and etic from the
participant responses.
Table 3
The Derivation of Themes (Researcher Etic)
Interview Question Link to RQ
Cultural Dimension
IQ1

RQ1, RQ2

Derived Theme (CD-Based)

CD1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9

Flat versus hierarchical
organizational structure.
IQ2
RQ1, RQ2
CD1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9
Personal empowerment.
Closed communities.
IQ3
RQ1
CD2, 4, 9
Triage versus sustainability.
Mission focus versus
population focus.
IQ4
RQ1, RQ2, RQ3 CD3, 6, 7, 9
Need for mutuality. Mutual
respect/appreciation.
Respect for
humanitarianism.
IQ5
RQ2, RQ3
CD3, 7, 8, 9
Mutuality through mutual
appreciation.
IQ6
RQ2, RQ3
CD1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9 Lack of understanding.
Unity of effort.
Note. The emerging themes are from the interview questions are expanded upon in the
following section.

Research Question 1: How do the organizations being examined differ with respect
to a description of the values associated with organizational culture and which are
most important to the individual groups?
My intended purpose of this research question was to set a baseline for deriving
the basic differences between the organizational cultures of the participants’
organizations. These organizational cultural differences were gleaned out of interview
statements and the observation of participant reactions to questions and the ensuing
discussion. Project GLOBE’s 2002 cultural dimension assessment model was used as a
baseline for deriving organizational cultural differences.
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Finding. The largest thematic difference between the culture sharing groups here
was a “flat” versus a hierarchical group. This is supported by Roberts' (2010) assessment
of military culture is described as having organizational structures that reinforce
hierarchical authority and clearly defined of command and control relationships. It is also
supported by the observation that the interviewees in Hilhorst and Schmiemann's 2002
study indicated a positive view of the “un-bureaucratic” nature of the organization during
their work conducting humanitarian assistance, specifically being empowered with
responsibility and flexibility of decision-making and actions (p. 497). They indicated that
they like the “horizontal” nature of the organization; un-bureaucratic and independent (p.
497). This theme was resonant throughout the interviews and indicates a strong
difference in CD2–power distance. The civilian aid workers describe a value of a shorter
power distance (more empowerment in the field) while the military officers describe
taking direction from higher headquarters for the higher levels of decision making. It
must be noted here, however, that a difference in observed values – hierarchical versus
“flat” only goes so far with respect to reality. Specifically, the military is directed by
national interests while NGOs actions are driven by donor requirements.
This observation, or theme, of organizational differences essentially answers an
element of my Research Question One (RQ1): How do the organizations being examined
differ with respect to a description of the values associated with organizational culture
and which values are most important to the individual groups? The military as an
organization values hierarchy and thus clearly defined command and control relationships
and NGOs value collaboration and empowerment on the ground. However, during the
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interviews, all participants indicated they were empowered at the tactical (field) level to
make decisions.
Another theme was that answered RQ1 that was derived from interview question
three was short term operational focus or triage versus long term focus or sustainability.
The military is “mission focused” (this is supported by Davis and Paparone’s 2012 study)
while civilian aid organizations are focused on humanitarianism (supported by both
Roberts’ 2010 research and Hilhorst and Schmiemann’s 2002 study). Civilian aid
organizations indicated a higher focus on sustainability in the population that they are
rendering aid to. Their responses tended to be more long term focused indicating a strong
value in CD7-future orientation and CD3–societal collectivism. Participant CAP stated
"We have more involvement, and I think I can make this a blanket statement, we have
more involvement with the people we are there to serve than the military. We work with
the local government if there is one. We work with the local people. We don't tell them
what they need. We asked what they have, what they need, what we can bring, what are
their priorities and we negotiate with them if we don't agree with their priorities." This
value essentially equates to “if you give a man a fish, he will eat for a day. If you teach a
man to fish, he will eat for a lifetime”. The inherent theme derived here of short term
versus long term focus with respect to humanitarian intervention provides another
indicated cultural disparity between civilian aid organizations and the military. This
theme adds more depth to my answer to RQ1 which revolves around organizational
differences. Essentially, the military is in a supporting role (in general) during
humanitarian crises and needs to provide this support quickly to the main effort (civilian
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aid organizations) so that the military can return to its core competency. Civilian aid
workers are focused on sustainability, thereby enabling the affected population and not
making them dependent upon outsiders.
Research Question 2: What patterns or themes emerge in terms of barriers to
mutuality when analyzing organizational cultural differences?
The purpose of research question 2 was to organize key participant discussions
and statements into themes derived from interviews and observations. These themes were
used to aid my development of the etic of the ethnographic analysis and ultimate
conclusions with respect to my researcher’s perspective or emic. This research question is
essential to determining barriers to mutuality between culturally disparate organizations
that may find themselves working together in a crisis response situation and is essential to
the overarching purpose of this study.
Finding. Participants from both the military and from civilian aid organization
felt a strong sense of empowerment within their respective organizations. This may very
well be due to each participant’s respective time working for their organization (all had at
least 30 years working for their organization). My observation here is that this in-group
collectivism found in statements from both military and civilian aid organizations is
indicative of inter-subjective behavior and patterns of thought and can be a cause of a
lack of coordination efforts. I derive from this a theme of both of these organizations
being “closed communities” due to their members spending long periods of time, isolated
from the day-to-day family and friends at home while operating in austere environments.
The result of this is inter-subjective behavior and patterns of thought, or essentially the
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group “closing ranks” to the point of not feeling positive about working with a culturally
disparate group. This essentially answers my Research Question RQ2 – What patterns or
themes emerge in terms of barriers to mutuality when analyzing organizational cultural
differences? This answer to RQ2 is supported by Roberts (2010) study that found that
NGO cultural attributes include (and are not limited to): organizational mandates are to
be fulfilled by staying autonomous, neutral, and impartial, taking instructions and being
tasked by outside organizations is generally not done, they value their freedom of
operations and are thus are suspicious of attempts to organize or integrate with others (p.
213).
The strongest them that emerged with respect to this research question may be
found in the answers to interview question six in which the participants were very
passionate about how a lack of understanding of each other creates a barrier. They all felt
that this lack of understanding takes time to overcome, and, through experience working
together and overcoming this barrier the result could be a more synergistic working
relationship. The theme “unity of effort” resounded in this question, indicating the
importance of professional growth and learning associated with performance orientation
(CD8). This is resonant in participant CAG’s statement (which is directly tied to barrier
mitigation in RQ3) "my organization is trying to push to the military is that unity of effort
and that it has to be a unity of effort among all organizations to be effective. It can’ be
parallel efforts and I will just use Haiti as an example – there were too many examples of
parallel efforts as opposed to unity of effort across the board, which led to inefficiencies
in that response."
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Research Question 3: How do the intrinsic value descriptions of organizational
culture result in barrier mitigation between United States military and
humanitarian aid workers belonging to United States military and humanitarian aid
workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations?
The purpose of research question three was to determine what values members of
the two participant organization hold as resiliencies; essentially what values a culturesharing group clings to as deep rooted values. These deep rooted values have the
potential to provide a basis for barrier mitigation if they are understood by both culturesharing groups and are demonstrated during crisis response.
Finding. The emerging themes from IQ4, part two regarding the participant
opinions of the alternate cultural group lead to answers to my third research question,
RQ3: How do the intrinsic value descriptions of organizational culture result in barrier
mitigation between United States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to
governmental and nongovernmental organizations? Participant MO2 felt strongly about
building better relationships between the two organizational types prior to a crisis. He
stated “I think that they need to train together (referring to the military and aid
organizations). There needs to be an adjustment in the personnel system that will put
them in positions at the Joint Forces Staff College or any of the (military) service
command and staff colleges or war colleges to have a much better sense and greater
experience in deliberate planning and a better understanding of the (military) services."
The civilian aid worker participants expressed similar sentiments.
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This indicates a theme, derived by participant statements and researcher
observation of a need for mutuality. This is supported by Roberts’ 2010 purposeful
research article which examined the organizational cultures of the military and
international NGOs in order determine “how best to structure for effectiveness the
increasingly vital peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts of the military and NGOs in
failing or failed states and combat zones around the world” (p. 212). A secondary theme,
also supported by this article, is that both organizations value what the other brings to
crisis response.
Both organizations demonstrate respect for human life or humanitarianism. In
interview question one, participant MO1 went into quite a bit of detail describing the
sense of urgency associated with preventing further loss of human life. At one point
during the large disaster response effort that he responded to, his military organization
noticed that thousands of victims who were displaced from their homes were gathering in
an open area. His organization realized that this open area would soon become a flood
zone with the impending rainy season, thus washing thousands of people out to sea. He
had discussions with the government of the affected nation and responding relief
organizations and they were planning to wait for a long term development focused
solution to the displaced persons situation. Essentially they wanted to wait and move
them into buildings, while participant MO1 wanted to get them out of the flood zone by
any means possible even if it meant moving them into tents in a safe area. This presented
a conflict in viewpoints and thus a theme related to CD7–future orientation. He stated
“there is no easy solution here, do you want to be answering the question “why you
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didn’t do anything to save these lives here” or do you want to be answering the question
“why you are preemptively doing an emergency movement?” I think it’s easier to explain
the latter rather than the former and try to address it." Eventually, the various
stakeholders came to agreement and the people were moved to a safer area and no lives
were lost due to floods. The theme arising from this instance is long versus short term
solutions and finding ways to mitigate these two barriers by coming together with a
humanitarian worldview.
The most prominent theme to this particular research question related to
performance orientation (CD8) and its importance to removing barriers to mutuality
through mutual respect of one another’s organizational values. Both organizations
recognize and value the capabilities and abilities of the disparate cultural group. It must
be noted here that all participants were observed to have a strong desire for better inter
organizational understanding between the two groups. All participants were most
passionate about this particular area of the need for mutuality as could be observed by
their spending extra time describing in detail personal experiences with actual cases of
challenges to working together and misunderstandings. Getting past these
misunderstandings of one another’s organizational culture in order to more effectively
alleviate human suffering was a resonant theme throughout all interviews.
The participants therefore indicated value in working together but not necessarily
losing their autonomy. Roberts' 2010 study found that cultural values of civilian aid
organizations reflected: organizational mandates are to be fulfilled by staying
autonomous, neutral, and impartial, taking instructions and being tasked by outside

108
organizations is generally not done, they value their freedom of operations and are thus
are suspicious of attempts to organize or integrate with others (p. 213). Going back to
participant CAP’s response to interview question one, she felt strongly about these values
by stating "the military tend to want to give us orders to do things and that, I will tell you,
is not the way to win friends and influence civilians. And where we need to discuss what
we're going to do and why we are going to do it, the military has limitations as far as their
mission statement.” But she also indicated an immense appreciation for the support
capabilities (communications, security, and logistics) that the military brings to the
humanitarian space. Likewise participant MO1 reflected that the humanitarian
community brings capabilities, such as public health and camp management, that the
military is just not well suited to manage.
Summary
Research question one asked how the organizations being examined do differ with
respect to a description of the values associated with organizational culture and which are
most important to the individual groups? The answer lies in the researchers etic as
derived from the strongest themes emerging from participant accounts. These were that
the largest thematic difference between the culture sharing groups here was a “flat”
versus a hierarchical group and that the military has a more short term operational focus
or triage versus the long term focus or sustainability valued by civilian aid organizations.
It is my opinion that the theme of organizations being hierarchical versus flat with respect
to organizational structure is a peripheral element with respect to this study. The decision
making element of these hierarchical versus “flat” aspects is the more important part of
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this theme. Ultimately, both organizations take guidance from their leadership, but
members of both organizations are empowered in the field with respect to making
decisions that are within their authoritative and legal limits. This, coupled with the long
term focus of aid workers versus the short term mission accomplishment focus of the
military provide the answers to research question one.
Research question two asked what patterns or themes emerge in terms of barriers
to mutuality when analyzing organizational cultural differences? Participants from both
the military and from civilian aid organization felt a strong sense of empowerment within
their respective organizations. My observation here is that this in-group collectivism
found in statements from both military and civilian aid organizations is indicative of
inter-subjective patterns and habits of thought and can be a cause of a lack of
coordination efforts. I derive from this a theme of both of these organizations being
“closed communities” due to their members spending long periods of time, isolated from
the day to day family and friends at home while operating in austere environments. The
result, and the answer to research question two is that these groups tend to “close ranks”
due to the phenomena of becoming closed communities due to operating away from
home with other members becoming their “society” (replacing their home society) for
long periods of time in austere locations. They do this to the point of not feeling positive
about working with a culturally disparate group.
Research question three asked how the intrinsic value descriptions of
organizational culture result in barrier mitigation between United States military and
humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental
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organizations. Both the civilian aid worker and participants expressed similar sentiments
that there is need for mutuality and that both organizations value what the other brings to
crisis response. Both organizations also demonstrate respect for human life or
humanitarianism. The most prominent theme to this particular research question related
to performance orientation (CD8) and its importance to removing barriers to mutuality
through mutual respect of one another’s organizational values, thus answering research
question three. Both organizations recognize and value the capabilities and abilities of the
disparate cultural group. It must be noted here that all participants were observed to have
a strong desire for better inter organizational understanding between the two groups,
collaboration, but not integration.
The strongest themes that emerged were a need for unity of effort and
humanitarianism from all participants, but this can be attributed to the nature of the lived
experience that was being discussed as a lived experience. Deeper analysis indicated that
humanitarian aid workers view themselves as having a strong degree of humanitarianism
in general and view their organizations as being “flatter” as opposed to hierarchical with
respect to power distance and decision making. They essentially viewed themselves as
having a collective approach to their decisions and actions during a humanitarian crisis
that is more inclusive and sustainable by the crisis affected population. Alternately, they
viewed the military as being hierarchical, short sighted with respect to humanitarian
interventions and having aggressive personalities with a lock step approach to
humanitarian action. They felt that the military is highly capable and is often a necessary
asset during humanitarian response. The military participants viewed themselves as being
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highly capable, well trained and cohesive which allowed them to transition from focusing
on their core competency (kinetic operations) to humanitarian action. Alternately, they
view the humanitarian aid workers as needing more training and resources and having a
long term development focus as opposed to fixing the immediate problem in front of
them. They also viewed the humanitarian community as being difficult to get a decision
from.
Ultimately, all participants agreed that removing the ad hoc nature of early
coordination and replacing it with more effective means of coordination through cultural
understanding would result in more efficient crisis response. Chapter five will explore
some recommendations for removing some of the ad hoc nature during the early phases
of crisis response and discuss how more research and education in this area may further
effect social change. Schein’s (2010) material on the different levels of culture were used
to examine the amount of inter cultural knowledge that is needed to arrive at mutuality
and as a basis for my recommendations.
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Chapter 5: Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
Culturally disparate organizations often find themselves working together in the
field in response to crises. Often coordination efforts are ad hoc at the outset of a crisis. I
intended to use this study to show that mutual understanding between these organizations
can be realized as the result of intercultural understanding among members of these
disparate organizations prior to the humanitarian crisis response. In this study, I
interviewed selected participants from the United States military and international aid
workers from governmental and nongovernmental organizations using qualitative, open
ended questions. I used narrative ethnography as the study’s methodology and asked
participants to describe in detail their experiences responding to humanitarian crises. This
allowed me to listen, observe, and ask follow up questions in order to establish what each
participant felt was most important with respect to their experiences. The data from these
interviews were essential in helping me to identify and understand the difference and
similarities in organizational cultures, the barriers that result from those differences, and
the potential areas for barrier mitigation.
Purpose of the Study
In this study, I aimed to improve cultural awareness between culturally disparate
organizations and designed it to help those organizations to avoid some of the initial
chaos at the outset of a crisis. Crisis response efforts are inherently chaotic in nature, but
developing an earlier understanding of the unique attributes of a separate organization in
advance has the potential to improve the swiftness and effectiveness of crisis response.
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I intended to use this study to determine the value of organizational cultural
understanding between disparate organizations prior to crisis response. Research has been
conducted on relationships and effectiveness within and between cultures in humanitarian
and peace operations, but a specific study and analysis of the often subjective
observations of one organization’s perceptions of a disparate organization’s culture has
not been conducted. This study and resulting analysis was accomplished by means of
focused, narrative-style interviews of a variety of participants of real world disaster relief
operations, and was aimed at increasing cross-cultural effectiveness prior to and during a
crisis event.
I examined the elements essential to collaborative cooperation between
organizations with differing organizational cultures and mandates, and worked to
determine whether a common purpose outweighs cultural differences. Many studies have
been conducted regarding organizational culture and leadership (Schein, 2010) and the
interrelationship between the organization’s values (how things should be) and practices
(how things are) (House, Javidan, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002). These prescribed crosscultural organizational values (defined by Project GLOBE as applied to the Competing
Values Framework) defined the theoretical basis for this study.
Additionally, my study built upon a study conducted at the U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College that utilized the Competing Values Framework. This recent
study examined the cultural differences between Department of State employees and
Department of Defense military officers in an effort to explore how “these [differences]
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related to conducting integrated and complementary efforts in national security” (Davis
& Paparone, 2012).
Nature of the Study
This study was exploratory in nature and thus derived a richer array of data
through the subjective approach associated with qualitative research that uses open ended
interview questions and observation of interview participants. My approach for this study
was a narrative organizational ethnography utilizing existing theory on organizational
culture from social psychologists Hofstede and Schein as a theoretical basis, while
modifying it with the additional cultural dimensions from Project GLOBE, a research
program that examines culture and leadership. My study revealed both disparities and
likenesses in organizational culture between the United States military and humanitarian
aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental organizations.
The overarching purpose of my research was to determine what barriers exist
between these two organizations because of existing inter-subjective patterns and habits
of thought, and ultimately to improve mutuality among disparate crisis responders prior
to a humanitarian crisis. The participant pool was comprised of selected individuals with
operational experience working side by side with culturally disparate organizations
during a crisis response. The data collection methodology consisted of interviews of
criterion based samples and inquiry by observation of those participants during the
interview process. These data collection tools were targeted at addressing the main
research problem which was aimed at determining how organizational culture can affect
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the norms of behavior accepted by individuals within an organization to the detriment of
working collectively with outside organizations who have a common purpose.
The most recent work of Hofstede et al. (2010) build upon Hofstede’s earlier
(1980) work describing a set of six cultural dimensions: uncertainty avoidance, power
distance, collectivism I (societal collectivism), collectivism II (in-group collectivism),
gender egalitarianism, and assertiveness. Project GLOBE (2002) has built upon these
cultural dimensions to include future orientation, performance orientation, and humane
orientation. They derived future orientation and humane orientation from Kluckholn and
Strodtbeck’s (1961) studies, and performance orientation from the work of McClelland
(1985). Project GLOBE utilized these cultural dimensions to diagnose disparities in
organizational culture as extant potential causal factors contributing to barriers resulting
from an organization’s inter-subjective patterns and habits of thought. I assumed that this
knowledge could ultimately lead to unity of effort earlier in the case of a crisis event.
Summary of Key Findings
Research question one asked how the organizations being examined differ with
respect to a description of the values associated with organizational culture, and which
are values are most important to the individual groups. The answer lies in my etic that I
derived from the strongest cultural themes emerging from participant accounts. These
answers showed that the largest thematic difference between the culture sharing groups
was a “flat” versus a hierarchical group, and that the military has a more short term
operational focus or triage approach, while civilian aid organizations have a more long
term focus and value sustainability. I found that the theme of hierarchical versus flat
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organization with respect to organizational structure was a peripheral element with
respect to this study. The decision making element of these hierarchical versus “flat”
aspects is the more important part of this theme. Ultimately, both organizations take
guidance from their leadership, but members of both organizations are empowered in the
field with respect to making decisions that are within their authoritative and legal limits.
This, coupled with the long term focus of aid workers versus the short term mission
accomplishment focus of the military, provide the answers to research question one.
Research question two asked what patterns or themes emerge in terms of barriers
to mutuality when analyzing organizational cultural differences. Participants from both
the military and from civilian aid organization felt a strong sense of empowerment within
their respective organizations. My observation here is that this in-group collectivism
found in statements from both military and civilian aid organizations is indicative of
inter-subjective patterns and habits of thought, and can cause a lack of coordination
efforts. I derived from this a theme that both of these organizations were “closed
communities” because of their members spending long periods of time isolated from the
day-to-day family and friends while operating in austere environments. The result and
answer to research question two is that these groups tend to “close ranks” due to the
phenomena of becoming closed communities that operate away from home; other
members become their “society” (replacing their home society) for long periods of time
in austere locations. They do this to the point of not feeling positive about working with a
culturally disparate group.
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Research question three asked how the intrinsic value descriptions of
organizational culture result in barrier mitigation between United States military and
humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental
organizations. Both the civilian aid worker and participants expressed similar sentiments
that there is need for mutuality, and that both organizations value what the other brings to
crisis response. Both organizations also demonstrate respect for human life or
humanitarianism. The most prominent theme to this particular research question related
to performance orientation (CD8) and its importance to removing barriers to mutuality
through mutual respect of one another’s organizational values. Both organizations
recognize and value the capabilities and abilities of the disparate cultural group. It must
be noted here that all participants were observed to have a strong desire for better inter
organizational understanding between the two groups, and all desired collaboration but
not integration.
Interpretation of the Findings
The strongest themes that emerged were a need for unity of effort, and
humanitarianism from all participants, but this can be attributed to the nature of the lived
experience that was being discussed. Deeper analysis indicated that humanitarian aid
workers view themselves as having a strong degree of humanitarianism in general and
view their organizations as being “flatter” and less hierarchical with respect to power
distance and decision making. They essentially viewed themselves as having a collective
approach to their decisions and actions during a humanitarian crisis that is more inclusive
and sustainable for the crisis affected population. Alternately, they viewed the military as
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being hierarchical and short sighted with respect to humanitarian interventions, and
having aggressive personalities with a lock step approach to humanitarian action. They
felt that the military is highly capable and is often a necessary asset during humanitarian
response. The military participants viewed themselves as being highly capable, well
trained, and cohesive which allowed them to transition from focusing on their core
competency (kinetic operations) to humanitarian action. Alternately, they viewed the
humanitarian aid workers as needing more training and resources, and as having a long
term development focus as opposed to fixing the immediate problem in front of them.
They also viewed the humanitarian community as being difficult to get a decision from.
I found that this summary of the emerging themes from the data collection and
analysis was not always consistent with existing literature. I state this because, when
examining culture, I found that there are underlying values that emerge as themes, but
when an organization’s values are put to practice in a humanitarian response, some of
those values become desires as opposed to reality. The emerging themes from each
research question are supported by the peer reviewed literature described in chapter two
of this study. The relation of interview question results to supporting literature ultimately
led me to answer each of my research questions.
Research question one asked “how do the organizations being examined differ
with respect to a description of the values associated with organizational culture and
which are most important to the individual groups”? The purpose of this research
question was to set a baseline for deriving the basic differences between the
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organizational cultures of the participants’ organizations using Project Globe’s (2002)
cultural dimensions as a theoretical basis.
The largest thematic difference between the culture sharing groups here was a
“flat” versus a hierarchical group. This is supported by Roberts' (2010) assessment of
military culture is described as having organizational structures that reinforce hierarchical
authority and clearly defined of command and control relationships. It is also supported
by the observation that the interviewees in Hilhorst and Schmiemann's 2002 study
indicated a positive view of the “un-bureaucratic” nature of the organization during their
work conducting humanitarian assistance, specifically being empowered with
responsibility and flexibility of decision making and actions (p. 497). They indicated that
they like the “horizontal” nature of the organization; un-bureaucratic and independent (p.
497). This theme was resonant throughout the interviews and indicates a strong
difference in CD2–power distance. The civilian aid workers describe a value of a shorter
power distance (more empowerment in the field) while the military officers describe
taking direction from higher headquarters for the higher levels of decision making. It
must be noted here, however, that a difference in observed values–hierarchical versus
“flat”-only goes so far with respect to reality. Specifically, the military is directed by
national interests while NGOs actions are driven by donor requirements.
This reality indicates that the perceived differences between the two organizations
is more of an intrinsic value embedded in each organization (how things should be) as
opposed to how things actually work in the field. Both organizations’ actions are guided
by higher headquarters’ mandates and policies. So while the values described in the
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supporting literature are validated by my data, the reality is that these two organizations
are not as different with respect to freedom of action as would be purported by Roberts’
(2010) and Hilhorst and Schmiemann’s (2002) studies.
Research question two posed the question “what patterns or themes emerge in
terms of barriers to mutuality when analyzing organizational cultural differences”? The
purpose of this question was to organize key participant discussions and statements into
themes derived from interviews and observations. These themes were used to aid my
development of the etic of the ethnographic analysis and ultimate conclusions from my
perspective as the researcher, thus my emic. This research question is essential to
determining barriers to mutuality between members of culturally disparate organizations
that may find themselves working together in a crisis response situation. The findings of
this question are essential to the overarching purpose of this study and, coupled with the
findings of research question three add to the body of data that exists from previous
studies of the organizational cultures of military and civilian aid organizations.
A key finding was that participants from both the military and from civilian aid
organization felt a strong sense of empowerment within their respective organizations.
This does not contradict any of the studies that I deemed most relevant to my study of
organizational culture. These were the studies by Hilhorst and Schmiemann (2002),
Roberts (2010), Kirke (2010) and Davis and Paparone (2012). Is must by noted here that
this feeling of empowerment may very well be due to each participant’s respective time
working for their organization (all had at least 30 years working for their organization).
My observation here is that this in-group collectivism found in statements from both
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military and civilian aid organizations is indicative of inter-subjective patterns and habits
of thought, and can be a cause of a lack of coordination efforts. I derive from this a theme
of both of these organizations being “closed communities” due to their members
spending long periods of time, isolated from the day-to-day family and friends at home
while operating in austere environments. This finding is supported by all of the above
stated relevant studies.
The result of this is inter-subjective patterns and habits of thought, or essentially
the group “closing ranks” to the point of not feeling positive about working with a
culturally disparate group. This essentially answers my Research Question RQ2 – What
patterns or themes emerge in terms of barriers to mutuality when analyzing
organizational cultural differences? This answer to RQ2 is supported by Roberts (2010)
study that found that NGO cultural attributes include (and are not limited to):
organizational mandates are to be fulfilled by staying autonomous, neutral, and impartial,
taking instructions and being tasked by outside organizations is generally not done, they
value their freedom of operations and are thus are suspicious of attempts to organize or
integrate with others (Roberts, 2010, p. 213). This led to discussion between myself and
each participant and ultimately allowed me to arrive at the first element of my emic. I
arrived at this first part of my emic by means of interpreting the strongest theme that
emerged with respect to this research question which was be found in the answers to
interview question six in which the participants were very passionate about how a lack of
understanding of each other creates a barrier. They all felt that this lack of understanding
takes time to overcome, and, through experience working together and overcoming this
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barrier the result could be a more synergistic working relationship. The first part of my
emic is that both organizations feel that the alternate organization is difficult to
understand due to differences in organizational culture.
Research question three asked “how do the intrinsic value descriptions of
organizational culture result in barrier mitigation between United States military and
humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental
organizations?” The purpose of this question was to determine what values members of
the two participant organization hold as resiliencies; essentially what values a culture
sharing group clings to as deep rooted values. These deep rooted values have the
potential to provide a basis for barrier mitigation if they are understood by both culture
sharing groups and are demonstrated during crisis response. Ultimately, these barriers
comprise the basis for the second part of my emic of this narrative, ethnographic study.
The finding for research question three is based upon the key emerging theme
from IQ4, part two regarding the participant opinions of the alternate cultural group. The
theme of a need for better mutuality through better understanding of organizational
cultural values emerged as a dominant area of discussion with respect to this research
question. This is supported by Roberts’ 2010 purposeful research article which examined
the organizational cultures of the military and international NGOs in order determine
“how best to structure for effectiveness the increasingly vital peacekeeping and
humanitarian efforts of the military and NGOs in failing or failed states and combat zones
around the world” (p. 212). A secondary theme, also supported by this article, is that both
organizations value what the other brings to crisis response. Ultimately, my emic, or

123
researcher’s interpretation of this theme was that the need for better mutuality by way of
valuing the capabilities of the disparate organization would result in more effective relief
of human suffering during a crisis event. Participants from both organizations valued
respect for human life or humanitarianism as the highest purpose for their organization.
Both organizations recognize and value the capabilities and abilities of the disparate
cultural group. It must be noted here that all participants were observed to have a strong
desire for better inter organizational understanding between the two groups. All
participants were most passionate about this particular area of the need for mutuality as
could be observed by their spending extra time describing in detail personal experiences
with actual cases of challenges to working together and misunderstandings. Getting past
these misunderstandings of one another’s organizational culture in order to more
effectively alleviate human suffering was a resonant theme throughout all interviews.
The participants therefore indicated value in working together but not necessarily
losing their autonomy. This is somewhat contradictory to Roberts' 2010 study which
found that cultural values of civilian aid organizations reflected: organizational mandates
are to be fulfilled by staying autonomous, neutral, and impartial, taking instructions and
being tasked by outside organizations is generally not done, they value their freedom of
operations and are thus are suspicious of attempts to organize or integrate with others (p.
213). Once again, the intrinsic values, in this case autonomy in the case of civilian aid
workers, is out matched by the ultimate reality of the need to relief human suffering. The
value of humanitarianism in civilian aid organizations is supported by the studies of
Hilhorst and Schmeimann (2002) and Roberts (2010). Mission accomplishment, in this
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case humanitarian mission accomplishment (in a supporting role), in the case of the
military is supported by the studies of Roberts (2010) and Davis and Paparone (2012).
Ultimately, all participants agreed that removing the ad hoc nature of early
coordination and replacing it with more effective means of coordination through cultural
understanding would result in more efficient crisis response. Chapter five will explore
some recommendations for removing some of the ad hoc nature during the early phases
of crisis response and discuss how more research and education in this area may further
effect social change.
Limitations of the Study
The immersive part of this ethnographic study was limited to personal and
professional relationships formed by working with and collaborating with participants by
means of professional conferences, and exchanging contact information and personal
experiences at schools. The key limitation was therefore my inability to observe the two
preformed groups working an actual disaster or crisis, which is both unpredictable and, at
the same time, financially and physically untenable for the researcher.
Throughout the study, I was careful to avoid personal organizational cultural bias
as a retired military officer and kept that bias from influencing the interpretation of
opinions and trends in the study. This is not only an ethical consideration of this research
study due to bias, but also a potential threat to validity as readers may read my biography
and make conclusions regarding bias. I conducted interviews and personality assessments
(with approval from the Walden University IRB # 04-01-15-0253434) by getting
participants to voluntarily respond to interview questions and by observing the
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participants during my interactive interviews. For both sets of interviews, I obtained
permission from the Institutional Research Board at Walden University and signed
informed consent forms from participants.
Recommendations
It is recommended that in order to more effectively respond as a multiorganizational group to a humanitarian crisis, potential responders must strive to educate
themselves (preferably by some formal requirement or incentive) to gain a deeper
understanding of potential co-responders. It have therefore used Edgar Schein’s (2010)
material on the different levels of culture to recommend the amount of intercultural
knowledge that is needed to arrive at mutuality.
Edgar Schein is the author of Organizational Culture and Leadership (2010), in
which he describes his theory that there are three levels of culture (p. 24). The lowest
level is what he terms “artifacts” or more simply the aspects of a culture sharing group
that we see, but that we do not necessarily understand (p. 24). It is easy to make
assumptions about a culture sharing group based upon these “artifacts”, but assumptions
can lead to misunderstanding, as is the case with two culturally disparate groups working
together for the first time. This is supported by Schein’s (2010) statement “the most
important point to be made about this level of the culture is that it is both easy to observe
and very difficult to decipher” (p. 24). Schein also warns that assumptions lead to false
interpretations (he describes this as dangerous) when he describes an observer seeing an
organization as being informal and equating that attribute to making the organization
inefficient (p. 25). Likewise another observer may see an organization that is very
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structured as being resistant to innovation (p. 25). These two assumptions can be seen
clearly in the participant interviews as the military participants viewed the civilian aid
workers as being “ad hoc” and the civilian aid workers viewing the military as being
“hierarchical”. This is particularly relevant to this study as it shows the need for potential
responders to humanitarian crises to strive to educate themselves on potential coresponder’s organizational cultural attributes or values. This can be done by attaining the
next level of cultural understanding described by Schein as “espoused beliefs and values”
(p. 25).
The espoused beliefs and values of an organization originate in personal values
and beliefs of what an individual feels about how things should be versus how things are
(p. 25). The personal values and beliefs of those individuals who prevail in decision
making when individuals come together as a group may become the shared values of the
group (p. 25). These individuals that prevail with respect to their influence in group
decision making or problem solving become leaders in the group and their individual
beliefs and values, in some cases but not all, evolve into the espoused beliefs and values
of the organization that the group becomes (p.25). Schein describes this process by
stating “such beliefs and values often become embodied in an ideology or organizational
philosophy, which then serves as a guide to dealing with the uncertainty of intrinsically
uncontrollable or difficult events” (p. 27); in the case of this study, a humanitarian crisis.
It is interesting to note here that this phenomenon reflects back to Hilhorst and
Schmiemann’s (2002) study on the relationship between an organization’s principles and
its culture utilizing an ethnographic approach and their theory that humanitarian
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organizations base their operations on the founding principles of humanitarianism, which
are based upon international humanitarian law the start of which being the Geneva
Convention of 1864 (Hilhorst & Schmiemann, 2002, p. 491). Schein warns, however, that
often these espoused beliefs and values may be abstract or in some cases mutually
contradictory, making certain behaviors confusing to an outsider as they only see part of
the puzzle (p. 27). This will not necessarily lead members of the participant organizations
(military and civilian aid workers) to attain Schein’s level three of organizational cultural
understanding, which is a deeper level of understanding of an organization’s basic
underlying assumptions (p. 28).
Level three, the deepest level of cultural understanding, is termed by Schein
(2010) as “basic underlying assumptions” (p. 28). This is when an organization uses the
same effective solution to a problem to a degree of repetition that the behavior becomes
second nature and the degree of variation or alternative solutions are not considered (p.
28). If a member of the organization challenges the underlying assumption, they make
other conformist members uncomfortable or anxious (p. 28). To quote Schein “in this
sense, the shared basic assumptions of a culture of a group can be thought of both at the
individual and group level as psychological cognitive defense mechanisms that permit the
group to continue to function” (p. 29). On the other hand, he states that “the human mind
needs cognitive stability” (p. 29) and this level of culture provides members of a group
with an identity and values that they can identify with (p. 29).
Accordingly, each of the organizations in this study possess an array of shared
values and beliefs regarding how things should be as well as a deeper level of basic
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underlying assumptions. It may not be possible for members of disparate organizations to
attain a level of cultural understanding amongst a variety of groups commensurate of
level three as that may take years of immersion in that organization. My recommendation
is clearly tied to the overall purpose of this study. The two disparate organizations in this
study need to embark upon a path in which they engage with one another on a regular
basis through education, training and other venues such as conferences in order to better
understand each other’s organizational espoused beliefs and values. This pathway will
allow the members of these two organizations to arrive at Schein’s (2010) level three of
cultural understanding as this level requires a degree of immersion in a culture that
appears to require years of membership in the organization. In other words, those aspects
of a culture that are unspoken and not clearly visible to outsiders who have not “grown
up” in an organization cannot be recognized through even frequent contact.
It is therefore my recommendation that these two types of organizations endeavor
to educate themselves on the other organization, beginning with research and online
educational tools. I further recommend that both military and civilian aid organizations,
as a sample from each organization indicates, endeavor to reach out and value the other
organization by inviting them to participate in educational venues in which the
opportunity for cross-organizational collaboration exists. I recommend that a follow on
study be conducted with respect to the effectiveness of organizational education through
the integration of members of military and civilian aid organizations. This study could be
tested in civilian academic institutions or in military academic institutions, such as the US
military service schools. The researcher could set a baseline of the understanding of one’s
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own organizations perceived values and that of the disparate organization’s values in the
form of a questionnaire. The members of the two organizations could be given a follow
up questionnaire asking questions aimed at determining their understanding of the
disparate organization after having an integrated educational event. This event could be a
class or simulation of a crisis event in which the two organizations were forced to work
together.
The emic derived from my study could be used to set a baseline for the thesis of
this follow on study and the cultural dimensions of Project GLOBE could be used as the
basis for the questionnaire given to participants before and after the educational stimulus
(class or simulation event). This could be a quantitative or mixed methods study utilizing
an instrument such as the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) and, in
the case of mixed methods, a series of interviews for greater fidelity of data collection.
This recommended follow-on study could very well test the themes and derived findings
of my study in an effort to move the intended audience of professionals from each
organization forward and arrive at a higher level of cultural understanding as described
by Schein (2010).
Implications for Social Change
The ultimate goal of this study is to affect social change through inter
organizational understanding, thus allowing disparate organizations to better work
together to alleviate human suffering in crisis situations. Knowledge is power and the
findings of this study may very well provide a knowledge base to members of
organizations that provide people and capabilities as response mechanisms to
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humanitarian crises. This social change is aimed at both organizations and individual
members of organizations. Ultimately, providing informational tools on cultural disparity
to crisis responders has the potential to save more lives and relieve human suffering
sooner rather than later in a crisis by stimulating mutuality among the various crisis
response organizations.
Organizations that typically respond to humanitarian crises often differ with
respect to organizational culture, thus presenting a barrier to effective inter organizational
efforts at the outset of a crisis. This problem can be exacerbated by the inherently chaotic
nature of crisis response causing friction and thus slowing United States military and
humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and nongovernmental
organizations’ arrival at the needed cooperative relationship and ultimately working to
achieve a common end state. The resultant situation is problematic: It is characterized by
parochialism driven organizational barriers, despite the presence of the common desire to
alleviate human suffering.
This problem has degraded the speed and efficacy of response humanitarian
response efforts due to the inherent organizational cultural differences between United
States military and humanitarian aid workers belonging to governmental and
nongovernmental organizations. These cultural differences made necessary a study that
provides knowledge to these organizations in order to promote mutual understanding and
appreciation for organizational strengths as a means for improving cooperation at the
outset of a crisis as opposed to during later stages. It is thus recommended that the
information from this study be used as a baseline, knowledge level foundation for the
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leadership (organizational policy makers and practitioners alike) to increase efforts to
make inter organizational integration common practice. This could be implemented in the
form of educational requirements for members of each organization to endeavor to
develop curriculum in their training and education venues that involves exposure and
collaboration with culturally disparate organizations. Too often organizations that spend
long periods of time in the field away from their society of origin become what can be
described as closed communities or closed cultural subsets. Getting to know outside
organizations can prove beneficial through acculturation and may very well prove that
what drives organizations to work together in a crisis is not so different from one culture
sharing group to another.
Conclusion
In this narrative ethnographic study I examined the differences in organizational
culture between military officers and civilian aid workers (both governmental and
nongovernmental). The overall purpose of my study was to determine what barriers result
from an organization’s inter-subjective patterns and habits of thought, and how to
improve mutuality prior to a humanitarian crisis. These barriers and the knowledge base
thereof provide a baseline for members of organizations that may typically, or at least
potentially may provide responders to humanitarian crises. The saying “knowledge is
power” is the bottom line. Lack of knowledge may very well deter from this bottom line
due to an unintentional ignorance or misunderstanding of what members of organizations
that are different from one’s own value.
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I found that the two organizations that I studied possess different world views
with respect to the mission or purpose of the organization. Their values, however, sound
very different when examining literature on studies of each organizational culture and its
attributes. When interviewing the actual practitioners, however, I found that both
members of both organizations held in common the basic value of humanitarianism and
its intrinsic motivation to help those who are suffering. This commonality has led to some
efforts in different organizations to better educate members about the nature of culturally
disparate organizations.
In my quest for knowledge, and as part of my day to day occupation as an
educator, I have seen these efforts progress. I have been asked to provide training to
civilian aid organizations (nonprofit volunteer organizations) on the basics of the
military. There have also been numerous professional conferences that I have attended
where U.S. Government organizations invite nongovernmental organizations (both
nonprofit and for profit) participate in an effort to better understand each other and
integrate efforts. Humanitarian crises are often the topic of discussion as these types of
operations and the response to them is not something likely to become obsolete. We must
take this fact forward as a driver, coupled with a common value of humanitarianism, and
endeavor to spread knowledge through education (driven as a requirement by
organizational leadership) and ultimately organizational mutuality. Returning to the old
saying “if you give a man a fish, he will eat for a day, but if you teach a man to fish, he
will eat for a lifetime”. I would like to take this one step forward by recommending that if
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we want to really understand another culture and invest in a higher degree of mutuality,
disparate organizations need to go fishing together.
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Appendix A: Title of Appendix
Data collection tool and Interview Protocol
The study is aimed at examining the differences in organizational culture between
military officers and non-governmental organization aid workers with an overall purpose
of determining what barriers exist due to organizational inter-subjective patterns and
habits of thought and how to improve mutuality prior to a humanitarian crisis. This
purpose warrants the use of a qualitative, ethnographic means of inquiry. Data will be
collected by means of participant interviews using open-ended questions. Data collection
will be done by means of opportunistic sampling and a narrative approach for interviews
of participants from each organization type that have experience working with the other
type of organization and experience responding to humanitarian crises.
Method
In this study, I will interview people from two very different organizations
(military officers and NGOs and other aid organizations. From the interviews, it is
expected to see similarities within the groups due to elements of inter subjectivity, but
differences between the organizational cultures. I will obtain written permission
(informed consent) from each participant as part of the study. It will be explained fully in
writing the purpose and design of the study to all participants ahead of time in a written
protocol form, reinforcing the purpose and design, as well as ethical requirement verbally
at the outset of interviews.
The interviews will establish themes and trends that can be coded regarding the
relationship between organizational bias with regards to inter subjectivity within each
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organization and bias with regards to perceptions of the other organization by utilizing a
cultural model. By conducting interviews with members of each organization in a private
setting (or by Skype or FaceTime if travel is cost prohibitive) utilizing open-ended
questions, I hope to be able to assess trends of how the participants perceive one-another
(thus deriving stereotypes) and how the members perceive their own organizational
values and practices.
Pre-formed groups (US Military members (retired) and civilian aid workers not
currently active) will provide a participant pool and the method of data collection will be
interviews of purposeful samples. This supports the main research problem that aims to
examine how organizational culture can affect the accepted norms of behavior by
individuals within that organizational culture to the point that it conflicts with outside
organizations with a common purpose. The ethnographic approach will allow the
examination of experiences of a particular group and the cultural influences that have
contributed to those experiences.
Research Questions
My central research question was whether a common purpose outweighs
cultural differences between culturally disparate organizations (in the case the military
and non-governmental organizations) in situations where they need to work together,
such as in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. My sub-questions
were related to existing theoretical lenses (Schein (2010) for organizational culture and
McClelland for human motivation) and targeted participant questions will be validated by
a selection of the cultural dimensions defined Hofstede, Hofstede and Mikov’s (2010)
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cultural dimensions “power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance index, and
masculinity and femininity” (pp.40- 41)”.
RQ1: How do the organizations being examined differ with respect to a
description of the values associated with organizational culture and which values are
most important to the individual groups?
RQ2: What patterns or themes emerge in terms of barriers to mutuality when
analyzing organizational cultural differences?
RQ3: How do the intrinsic value descriptions of organizational culture result in
barrier mitigation between United States military and humanitarian aid workers
belonging to governmental and non-governmental organizations?
The study is aimed to detect and organize themes identified from a priori ideas
such as pre-existing theories to start coding and then allow the bias that the participants
provide to form a basis for my study. In this study, the my intent is to use an appropriate
selection of a priori ideas from Project GLOBE’s nine cultural dimensions (uncertainty
avoidance, power distance, societal collectivism, in-group collectivism, gender
egalitarianism, assertiveness, future orientation, performance orientation, and humane
orientation) (House, et al., 2002) to add theoretical and historical validity to the
previously mentioned study questions. The interview portion of this study will consist of
open ended questions that have a basis founded in Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. The
interviews, just as the observation field notes, will be recorded on my IPhone or IPad and
then transcribed. The intended Interview questions are:
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Question 1: What do you think makes your organization successful? What are you
proud of with respect to your organization? (In-group collectivism, future orientation,
performance orientation, humane orientation)
Question 2: What makes the leadership in your organization effective in
producing organizational and public value? Do you personally feel empowered by your
leadership? (Uncertainty avoidance, power distance, in-group collectivism, assertiveness,
performance orientation, humane orientation)
Question 3: How are decisions made in your organization? (Power distance, ingroup collectivism, humane orientation)
Question 4: How often have you worked with members of organization y? What
is your opinion of organization y? (If the person has not worked with the other
organization, the questioning strategy with drive the interviewee to provide their opinion
of the organization (Future orientation)
Question 5: What value do you see in working with organization y? (Societal
collectivism, future orientation, performance orientation, humane orientation).
Question 6: Do you think that barriers exist between your organization x and
organization y that affect working relationships? (Uncertainty avoidance, power distance,
in-group collectivism, assertiveness, performance orientation, humane orientation).
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Appendix B: Informed Consent Form
You are invited to participate in the following study due to your experience as a
responder to a humanitarian crisis and having experience working with (members of the
US Military – in the case of a consent form sent to a civilian aid worker) or (members of
civilian aid organizations – in the case of a consent form for a retired military member).
This study involves research in which you will be a voluntary participant and your
responses will be used to gather data with respect to the study of organizational culture.
1. Research Title: Improving the Efficacy of Humanitarian Response through
Mutuality Derived From Inter-organizational Cultural Understanding
2. Primary Investigator/Researcher Contact Information: Elizabeth Anne
Yeomans, doctoral student at Walden University.
3. Purpose of the Research:
•

Improve cultural awareness between culturally disparate organizations and
help those organizations to avoid some of the initial chaos at the outset of
a crisis.

•

Developing an earlier understanding to improve crisis response.

•

Value knowledge of organizational cultural understanding prior to vice
during crisis response.

•

Make resultant cultural disparities available via existing humanitarian
protocols.

4. Procedures: I will be conducting interviews with selected participants.
Interviews will be conducted at your convenience either in person or through media such
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as Skype or FaceTime (phone interviews are another option should that be the only
choice available. Interview questions are aimed at finding cultural disparities between
organizations that respond to humanitarian crises and are intended to spur conversation
about personal experiences and perceptions of your own and the alternate organization.
Interview questions are general in nature (open-ended) and can be provided to you in
advance should you desire. Your interview will be audio-recorded and then transcribed
by me (no third party will see or hear it). You will be provided with a copy of the
transcript for your review to ensure accuracy and to protect your rights as a voluntary
participant since you can withdraw from the study at any time.
The populations from which the samples will be drawn are from civilian aid
worker organizations and military officers that meet the following requirements:
Field experience conducting humanitarian aid
Field experience working in a civilian-military coordination environment
5. Risks and Mitigations: There are minimal risks to you with respect to your
participation in this study. Should you feel uncomfortable at any time during the
interview process, the interview will cease and I will discuss with you any risks that may
arise. Bear in mind that your identity and any personal attributes which could lead to your
identification (age, position during the humanitarian response, exact organization, etc.)
will be kept strictly confidential between myself as the researcher and you as the
participant.
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6. Benefits: I cannot provide incentives such as money or promotion, but the
study is aimed at positive social change in that it aims to make organizational
coordination at the outset of a crisis more efficient and effective.
7. Length of Time: The interview will take no longer than one hour, but should
you desire to discuss the topic for greater length of time, this will be at your discretion
and convenience. Should I, the researcher see the potential for additional time, I will
discuss this with you and time extension determinations will be at your discretion.
8. Payment or Cost: I cannot provide payment to you as a participant and any
costs associated, such as my travel to your location for the interview, will solely be
incurred by me as the researcher.
9. Confidentiality: Your data collected will be kept strictly confidential. What this
means to you: Confidential data contains one or more identifiers, but identifiers are kept
private by myself as the researcher. This will be done in this study in order to protect
participant privacy and assure that study participation is truly voluntary. I confirm that I
will provide complete confidentiality.
10. Participant Rights: You have the right to withdraw from participation at any
time; if significant new findings are developed during the course of the research which
may relate to your willingness to continue participation, I will notify you immediately.
You may keep a copy of the informed consent form.
11. Voluntary Consent:
Your participation in this study is voluntary and refusal to participate or withdraw
will not result in any adverse consequences or any loss of benefits that you are otherwise
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entitled to receive. You may withdraw from this study at any time without consequence.
Information that you provide as part of this study will be kept confidential and will not be
divulged to others in ways that are inconsistent with the understanding of this disclosure
without permission. Your signature below indicates that you agree to participate in this
study. If you have any questions about your rights as a participant or this form, please
contact the Walden University IRB at irb@waldendu.edu.
12. Signature Blocks:

Participant Signature / Date:
_____________________________________________________________

Primary Investigator Signature / Date:
______________________________________________________
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Appendix C: Invitation to Participants
Invitation to Participate in a Doctoral Study – Provided By E-Mail to Participant Pool
You are invited to take part in a research study of how differences between organizations
responding together in a humanitarian crisis could potentially present unintended
consequences – the key consequence is a slow response to human suffering. I am inviting
people who have responded to humanitarian crises in the past who had a key role in the
response and who have either military or civilian aid worker experience to participate in
the study.
This study is being conducted by a researcher named Elizabeth Yeomans, who is a
doctoral student at Walden University. You may already know the researcher as a faculty
member at the Joint Forces Staff College, but this study is separate from that role and I
will not be recruiting participants from the Joint Forces Staff College to participate in this
study or acting in any role that would represent the Joint Forces Staff College in this
study.
Background Information:
The purpose of this study is to improve cultural awareness between culturally disparate
organizations and help those organizations to avoid some of the initial chaos at the outset
of a crisis by developing an earlier understanding to improve crisis response.
Procedures:
If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to be interviewed either in person or via
Skype or FaceTime by the researcher. Your answers will be kept confidential as will your
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identity and attributes particular to your identity. The interviews will take approximately
one hour of your time and will be conducted at your convenience.
Please let me know if you are interested in being interviewed or if you have further
questions.
Sincerely,
Elizabeth Yeomans (Doctoral Student, Walden University)
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